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Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:
New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the
Right to Vote?
by CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF*
Introduction
This essay advances a tentative hypothesis about the relationship
between the status of the right to vote as an individual right and the
existence of manageable standards for adjudication. The Supreme Court
has long maintained that the right to vote is an individual, personal right,'
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. BA, Oberlin College, 1994; JD, Yale
Law School, 2001. This paper benefited tremendously from presentation and discussion at the
Georgetown University Law Center's Faculty Research Workshop and the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly's "Frontiers of Democracy" Symposium; from careful readings and
generous feedback offered by Ned Foley, Heather Gerken, Ellen Katz, Ethan Leib, and Mark
Scarberry; as well as from conversations and email correspondence with, among others, Vik
Amar, Alan Brownstein, Floyd Feeney, Greg Klass, Justin Levitt, Dan Tokaji, and Christine Van
Aken. Tony Valizan did valuable work as my research assistant, and Deans Rex Perschbacher
and Kevin Johnson provided generous support. Disclosure: the author of this article co-wrote an
amicus brief that was filed on behalf of the petitioners in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, Nos. 07-21 & 07-25 (argued Jan. 9, 2008).
I. This idea traces back to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). An
individualistic sensibility about the right to vote is also apparent from the rhetoric in Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) and Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), where the Court
stressed the plaintiff-voter's "fault" or lack thereof in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to
advance-enrollment requirements for voting in primary elections. See Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA.
L. REv. 313, 353-57 (2007) (describing this rhetorical emphasis, but suggesting that the true basis
for the line drawn in these decisions probably lay elsewhere).
The Supreme Court has affirmed the nominally individualistic nature of the right to vote in cases
about vote dilution caused by the design of equi-populous legislative districts. The
"representational" injuries suffered by a racial or partisan group were not seen to implicate the
fundamental right to vote at all, because citizens who belonged to the disadvantaged groups
remained free to vote (if not to be represented) on equal terms with others. See City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (rejecting argument of dissenting Justices Marshall and Brennan that
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and, related to this, that theories of democracy should do no analytical
work in constitutional voting rights adjudication.2 These ideas took root in
response to Justice Frankfurter's famous warning that in wading into
questions about the right to vote and the apportionment of population
among legislative districts, the Court would be adjudicating Republican
Form of Government claims in disguise-contrary to precedent and
unbefitting an institution whose proper role is to protect individual rights.
He warned that in so doing, the Court jeopardized its reputation as an
institution above partisan politics-a reputation upon which public
acceptance of its rights-enforcing role was thought to depend.3
My hypothesis is that the "individual rights" and "no theory" precepts,
which have served the Court adequately for more than forty years, will
soon need to be abandoned-for the very reasons that initially motivated
their adoption. Justice Frankfurter's worries were well placed but his
prescription that courts should touch upon "political" matters only as the
incidental byproduct of enforcing individual rights, is outdated.4 Under
contemporary circumstances, the courts would have an easier time
developing judicially manageable rules for decision if they adopted an
expressly structural understanding of the right to vote, while scaling back
the individual entitlement to vote free from burdens that are not shared by
others. Scrutiny levels should be tied to the aggregate consequences of
voting requirements for the rate and demographics of voter participation.
A workable approach along these lines could be founded upon (1) a
perfectionist account of what it means for a legislative body to be "chosen
by the people" within the meaning of Article I and the Seventeenth
Amendment (against which the results of actual, imperfect elections may
be compared); and (2) a story about the deference due to states by virtue of
racial vote dilution claims may be founded on the "fundamental rights" prong of equal protection
analysis).
The nominal status of the right to vote as an individual right was reiterated most recently in Bd. of
Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989), where the Court stressed, in the context
of a one person, one vote challenge to borough-based representation on the Board of Estimate,
that "[t]he personal right to vote is a value in itself .... " Id. at 698.
2. The path of this idea is chronicled in Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
459 (2004).
3. See generally Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases:
Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411 (2002).
4. This is not to deny that the Supreme Court's adoption of an expansive political question
doctrine (as Frankfurter espoused) would enable it to avoid much partisan political conflict. But
once it is clear that the courts are going to adjudicate constitutional voting rights claims-as it is
today-the "individual rights" perspective may make it difficult to develop manageable rules of
decision.
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their constitutionally-assigned role as regulators-in-the-first-instance of the
time, place, and manner of federal elections.
To date, the Court's interventions in the political process seem not to
have occasioned the loss of judicial legitimacy that Frankfurter feared.'
But there is afoot, it appears, an important change in the number and
composition of constitutional voting rights cases reaching the courts. For
the first time in a generation, the courts face a significant number of cases
in which the plaintiffs maintain that a state has unconstitutionally hindered
voting-eligible citizens' ability to cast a valid, correctly-counted ballot.
6
(Following Professor Karlan, I shall refer to these as voter participation
claims.7) Unlike the first generation of voter-participation claims, however,
the new litigation does not target de jure vote denial. The state laws and
regulations under attack do not purport to identify and exclude a class of
citizens that ought not to participate in the selection of elected officials. 8
Rather, these laws merely define the process by which voting-eligible
citizens may record their political preferences come election time. The
"nuts and bolts" at issue include voting machine technologies, voter
registration laws, voter identification requirements, voter-database
maintenance procedures, laws authorizing partisan "challengers" at the
polling place, regulations of third-party voter registration drives, and
5. Cf James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of
2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCi. 535 (2003) (finding that by
early 2001, there appeared to be few residual effects of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore on
the Court's legitimacy); Herbert M. Kritzer, The American Public's Assessment of the Rehnquist
Court, 89 JUDICATURE 168 (2005) (finding little change in support for the Court by Democrats
and Independents following Bush v. Gore). Note, however, that political conflict over judicial
appointments, which the Court's involvement in high-stakes political questions may feed, has
been shown to affect judicial legitimacy. See James L. Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Supreme
Court Nominations, Legitimacy Theory, and the American Public: A Dynamic Theory of the
Positivity Bias (working paper, July 4, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998283.
6. This claim is admittedly impressionistic. It is based upon my initial reading of lower-
court decisions from the 1960s to the present. I have not yet tried to quantify what I believe is a
recent upsurge in voter participation litigation. Some suggestive evidence is provided in Charles
Anthony Smith & Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The Judicialization of
Presidential Elections, 6 ELECTION L.J. 251 (2007). Smith and Shortell document a massive
increase in pre-election litigation during presidential-election years from 1992 through 2004, with
voter access and vote-counting issues being the focus of half of the lawsuits in 2000 and well
over half in 2004. Id. at 254-56.
7. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1705 (1993) (distinguishing participation-, representation-, and governance-based claims).
8. The principal exception is the handful of suits challenging felon disenfranchisement,
These claims are largely grounded on the Voting Rights Act rather than the Constitution, as felon
disenfranchisement was approved for constitutional purposes in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24(1974).
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more.9 As I write, the leading edge of the wave of litigation has just
reached the Supreme Court, in the form of a facial challenge to Indiana's
recently-enacted photo ID requirement for voting, said by many to be the
most restrictive voter identification law in the nation.' ° The Court's last
decision concerning regulatory barriers to the exercise of the franchise by
adult, voting-age citizens was issued in 1974.11
The current upsurge in voter participation litigation may have been
spurred, in part, by the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore'2 and the
resulting wave of legislative attention to the voting process. 13 Renewed
attention to the logistics of election administration has occurred at a time
when the two major political parties are evenly matched at the national
level, 14 giving each a powerful incentive to re-jigger the voting process so
as to facilitate or retard (as the case may be) the casting of ballots by each
party's core constituencies. 15  The conventional wisdom has it that
Republicans nowadays take advantage of unified party control of
government by enacting stringent voter-ID requirements, restrictions on
voter registration drives by civic groups, and the like, whereas Democrats
seek to expand voter participation via election-day registration, early-
voting centers, vote-by-mail reforms, and related measures. 16 When critics
9. For a sampling, see Election Law @ Moritz, Major Pending Cases,
http://moritzIaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/index.php.
10. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
128 S. Ct. 33 (2007).
11. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13. See Smith & Shortell, supra note 6, at 258-59 (noting that forty-one cases during the
2004 election year "arose as a direct result of electoral reform[s]" enacted after the 2000
presidential election).
14. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election.
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 947-50 (2006).
15. Smith and Shortell provide convincing evidence that the increase in pre-election
litigation during presidential-election years has been driven by partisan strategy. Litigation is not
randomly distributed; rather, it has been concentrated in states that are competitive as between the
two major parties, and that have large troves of Electoral College votes. See Smith & Shortell,
supra note 6, at 259-64. Moreover, both parties increased their direct participation in litigation
from 2000 to 2004, with the number of cases in which one party was named as a litigant rising
from five in 2000 to eighteen in 2004. Id. at 258.
16. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-28
(2007) ((describing the "rise in partisan election administration laws") ("[E]lection administration
has become more, rather than less, politicized [since Bush v. Gore]. State legislatures have not
searched for an honest broker to design and implement fair and impartial electoral rules. Many
Democrats appear concerned only about problems of voter 'access,' while many Republicans
appear to care only about voter fraud or 'ballot integrity."')) (alteration in original). Compare
United States Senate Republican Committee, The Need for New Federal Reforms: Putting an End
to Voter Fraud (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
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of the Republican agenda have lost out in the legislature, they have turned
to the courtsl 7-so far with mixed success. Photo-ID requirements have
been enjoined in Georgia,18 Missouri, 19 and New Mexico,20 and allowed to
take effect in Arizona,21 Georgia,22 Indiana,23 and Michigan.24 Restrictions
on voter-registration drives have been enjoined in both Florida and Ohio;
25
and in Texas, a criminal law that limited who may possess a voter's
absentee ballot was trimmed back through judicial action.26
The litigants' mixed success in the courts corresponds to a striking
partisan divide among judges. That is the lesson to date of the voter-ID
litigation. By my count, there have been fourteen votes by Democratic
judges against the constitutionality of photo-ID requirements, and only
three votes indicating that the requirement at issue is permissible.27 For
Republican judges, the respective numbers are three (against
constitutionality) and fifteen (for constitutionality). These numbers must
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Febl5O4VoterFraudSD.pdf (proposing national anti-fraud reforms),
with Press Release, Democratic National Committee, DNC Announces Expanded National Voter
Protection Effort (Aug. 3, 2006), available at,
http://www.democrats.org/a/2006/08/dnc_announces-e.php (announcing a multi-pronged
offensive against asserted Republican efforts to disenfranchise Democratic voters).
The conventional wisdom is probably correct, but there is a pressing need for quantitative
empirical research examining how the partisan composition of state legislatures affects the
development and adoption of electoral reforms.
17. There are few if any doctrinal hooks for challenging the Democrats' preferred reforms
on constitutional grounds. Then again, these reforms do not appear to have had their hoped-for
partisan effects. See generally Adam J. Berinsky, The Perverse Consequences of Electoral
Reform in the United States, 33 AM. POL. RES. 471 (2005).
18. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
19. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W. 3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
20. ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, No. Civ. 05-1136, 2007 WL 782167 (D.N.M. Feb. 12,
2007).
21. Gonzalez v. Ariz., No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006),
affd, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
22. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
23. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), affd sub nom.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
24. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, No.
130589 (Mich. 2007).
25. League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(issuing a preliminary injunction against a law that fined voter registration organizations for late
submissions); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (preliminarily
enjoining law that establishes registration and training requirements, backed by criminal
penalties, for paid participants in voter-registration drives).
26. Ray v. State of Texas, No. 2:06-CV-385 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 31, 2006) (order granting
preliminary injunction against state law penalizing possession of absentee ballots by most persons
other than the voter herself).
27. See Appendix (for a summary of the judicial votes).
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be taken with several grains of salt,28 but the pattern has an intuitive
ideological logic.
Unlike many other constitutional questions about election law, the
new voter participation claims present legal issues as to which a judge's
ideological and jurisprudential commitments are very likely to dovetail
with the electoral interest of her appointing President's political party.
29
Liberal judges probably believe that the Constitution, as glossed by the
28. First, the sample size is small and I have not conducted any statistical analysis. Second,
a number of the judicial votes included in my summary figures were taken on preliminary
injunction motions, or motions for rehearing en banc. It is conceivable that judicial partisanship
or its appearance will prove less pronounced on merits rulings. Third, the Appendix only
includes votes on photo-ID laws, which among all the recent voting reforms have been the object
of the fiercest partisan controversy in the legislative arena and the most attention in the press.
Judicial partisanship or its appearance may prove less pronounced as to issues (like voter-
registration reform) that have been less prominently featured in the press. As with the question of
how state government party control affects the adoption of electoral reforms (see supra note 16),
here too there is a pressing need for systematic empirical research.
29. By way of comparison, consider retrogression claims under the Voting Rights Act, and
one-person, one-vote claims under the Equal Protection Clause. It is conventional wisdom that,
within a system of single member districts, "majority minority" districts benefit the Republican
Party by concentrating reliable Democratic voters into a small number of districts. See, e.g.,
DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RAcIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997). Yet ideologically, the creation of majority minority
districts manifests a kind of race consciousness that is distasteful to many republicans. This has
resulted in judicial decisions like Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), in which the five
conservative Justices voted to relax the retrogression standard in a manner that gives the
Democratic Party more flexibility to spread out minority voters for maximum political advantage,
with the four liberal Justices dissenting. A nearer correspondence between ideology and
partisanship would seem to be presented by challenges to at-large elections under section two of
the Voting Rights Act, the dismantling of which is conventionally thought to benefit democrats as
well as minority voters. There is some evidence that democrats were more likely than
republicans to vote to dismantle such districts, but the evidence is equivocal. See Adam B. Cox
& Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008). A serious
partisan division on this front may well have been avoided thanks to the Supreme Court's
establishment of a reasonably mechanical test for adjudicating these claims. See Thomburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57-58 (1986).
As to one-person, one-vote claims, the empirical evidence suggests that democratic judges were
more likely than republican judges to find malapportionment violations as the constitutional
standard was being developed. See Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in
Judicial Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413
(1995). But because both parties are able to use malapportioned plans for partisan purposes, this
ideological effect does not have a clear partisan valence. (It is true that partisan effects were also
present, in the sense that, other things equal, judges were more likely to vote against plans
developed by the opposing party than by their own party. Id. at 417-18. But, strikingly, judges
were also more likely to vote against plans developed by their own party than against nonpartisan
or bipartisan plans. Id.
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Warren Court,30 is a charter for popular self-government, and that every
adult citizen must be enabled and encouraged to vote.3' Conservative
jurists may well see the generic right to vote as an illicit, a-textual "right"
that exists only because the Warren Court made it up.32 The conservative
may point out that although the Constitution by its terms bars
discrimination with respect to voting on the basis of race, sex, age (for
citizens over eighteen), and, for purposes of federal elections, failure to pay
a tax, the Constitution also expressly authorizes the states to set
"qualifications" for electors in state and congressional elections. The
natural implication is that the states have substantial discretion to limit the
franchise to those citizens most likely to exercise it in a considered,
responsible manner, so long as the franchise-limiting enactment does not
discriminate on the expressly forbidden grounds.33
This position was rejected in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections34 and Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15.35 But judges
who see Harper and Kramer as interpretively illegitimate may want to read
them narrowly, so as to give the states some room to set voter
qualifications sub silentio. Such a jurist might well see photo-ID laws, for
example, as ideal sub silentio qualifications. A photo-ID requirement
could serve to limit the franchise, de facto, to those citizens who either are
full-fledged participants in the modem, formal economy (and as such
almost surely possess a driver's license or passport), or who care enough
about voting to incur the cost and inconvenience of obtaining a driver's
license or passport for this purpose. The costs will be greatest for citizens
who do not already possess an official copy of their birth certificate, and,
the conservative might argue, this is precisely as it should be. Citizens who
lack access to their birth certificates probably lead chaotic, irregular lives,
and such citizens cannot be trusted with the franchise.
If I am right about these basic differences in normative outlook, it
should not be surprising that judges operating within an indeterminate
30. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
32. None of the Warren Court's foundational voting rights decisions were well-grounded in
the text, early history, or structure of the Constitution.
33. There was, of course, a long history in the United States and elsewhere in the Western
world of reserving the franchise to those citizens believed capable of exercising it in a responsible
manner. Property qualifications and literacy tests for voting are familiar examples.
34. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
35. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626-27.
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doctrinal framework reach seemingly partisan decisions. That it is not
surprising does not make it any less worrisome, however. Frankfurter's
anxieties about judicial legitimacy may yet be borne out. Political
scientists have repeatedly shown that the U.S. Supreme Court, at least,
enjoys a "reservoir" of support among the mass public that is substantially
independent of citizens' agreement with the merits of particular court
rulings.36 Sometimes labeled "diffuse support," this willingness to accept
judicial judgments with which one disagrees and to defend the institution of
judicial review seems connected to citizens' perception of the Court as a
distinctly legal, as opposed to political, institution. 7 Some scholars have
speculated that the trappings of legality-the black robes, the stylized
modes of argumentation, etc.-are responsible for this.38 But whatever the
origins of diffuse support, it seems fair to expect that the mass public's
perception of courts as above politics will gradually erode if highly partisan
election-law issues become a recurring part of the judicial docket and
judges consistently take "their" respective party's side in answering the
question presented.39 The mainstream media is catching on to the emerging
pattern of judicial partisanship 4° and the public cannot be kept in the dark
indefinitely.
The partisan judicial divide in voter-participation litigation also raises
serious questions about whether American courts, as presently constituted,
can perform the functional role ascribed to them by the most widely
accepted normative account of constitutional judicial review: the role of
representation reinforcer. 41 When one political party uses its position of
control over the legislative and executive branches of government to enact
voting requirements that the other major party regards as a ploy to deter its
constituents from exercising the franchise, the need for representation-
reinforcing review would seem to have reached its apogee. Yet if judges
36. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for
the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCi. 635, 637 (1992).
37. Id.; see also John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion:
Popular Expectations Regarding the Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL.
BEHAV. 181 (2001); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928 (2000).
38. E.g., Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 36, at 659.
39. Cf Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M. Howard, Framing Support for the Supreme Court
in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. POL. 676 (2003) (finding that a results-oriented framing of
the Court's decision undermines public support).
40. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Partisan Fissures Over Voter ID; Justices to Hear Challenge
to Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at At. My impression is that in reportage on election law
decisions, it is increasingly common to note judges' political party affiliations.
41. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Michael J. Klarman,
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).
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(despite their situational remove from ordinary politics) have partisan
prejudices or ideological commitments that consistently lead them to side
with "their side" in the legislature, it is hard to see what good can come
from judicial review in such cases. We certainly cannot expect judicial
review to make the law substantively fairer, or more reasonable, or better
aligned with constitutional precepts. Nor can we count on the courts to
perform a legitimation function, keeping factions that lose out in the
political arena from disavowing the system altogether.42 If judges answer
political-process questions as if they were de facto agents for their political
party of choice, what reason is there for losing factions to defer to the
judicial determination?
Now, assuming I am correct about all of this 43-the new partisan
interest in shaping the composition of the voting public, the related
proliferation of voter-participation cases, the correspondence between
judicial ideology and party interest in the resolution of such cases, and the
threat that this poses to the judicial legitimation function and public
acceptance of judicial independence-it hardly follows that the courts must
adopt a structural understanding of the right to vote, one grounded in a
political theory of the franchise and its regulation under our Constitution.
All that is needed, one might think, is a rule-bound doctrinal framework
that permits little judicial discretion. There's no a priori reason to believe
that such a framework could not be grounded upon an individualistic or
even an agnostic understanding of the right to vote. Indeed, if the last forty
years is any guide, the Supreme Court would seem perfectly capable of
developing bright-line rules to regulate the voting process without overt
recourse to a political theory of voting.44
This objection is correct in one important respect. My argument for a
structural approach is contingent rather than logical. It rests on what I see
as the presently available individualistic, agnostic, and structural/aggregate-
consequences approaches, and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
42. Cf CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960) (arguing that this
legitimation function is the principal service performed by the U.S. Supreme Court).
43. This is a big "if." The stylized facts I have presented will need further empirical
corroboration before the argument of this paper can be described as anything more than a very
tentative conjecture.
44. Examples include: the one-person, one-vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577
(1964), including the "10% safe harbor" exception for state and local legislative districts. (see
Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)); the fifty-day upper bound on advance
registration requirements for voting in general elections (see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681
(1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973)); and the prohibition against state laws that
condition political participation upon payment of a fee or ownership of property (see, e.g., Harper
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974)).
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In another respect, however, the objection oversimplifies matters. The
"manageability" of a doctrinal standard for regulating partisan conflicts
over the ground rules of electoral competition is not just a function of its
rule-like clarity (or lack thereof). 45  As to some politically contentious
questions in election law, it may not be possible for judges to reach
agreement on a bright-line rule for classifying regulations as presumptively
permissible or presumptively impermissible on their face. The available
candidates for a bright-line rule may be ludicrous, or too easy for
exclusion-minded legislators or election administrators to end run. No one
would suggest, for example, that a voter ID law should be subjected to
strict scrutiny simply because the law requires voters to display
photographic ID. The mere fact that a photograph is required tells little
about whether the ID law will be easy or difficult for voters to comply
with.
If a bright-line/facial-classification rule is not in the cards, jurists must
come up with other ways of thinking about the manageability of plausible
alternatives. For the purpose of resolving constitutional challenges to
highly partisan electoral reforms, I would deem a doctrinal approach "more
manageable" to the extent that: (1) it does not require or invite judges to
rely upon their own sense of justice or political fairness, insofar as those
judgments correlate with the partisan interest of the political party with
which the judge is associated in the public's mind;46 (2) it represents an
acceptable compromise for a spectrum of liberal and conservative judges-
so that its adoption does not look like a purely political decision by a
fractured Supreme Court, and so as to increase the odds of good-faith
application by the run of lower court judges;47 (3) it limits the total number
of cases that the courts will have to decide; 48 (4) it operates to time judicial
intervention propitiously, facilitating intervention during times when the
45. For a sensitive treatment of this point, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1287-93 (2006).
46. Cf. id. at 1289-90 (arguing that open-ended standards are relatively "manageable" when
there is a consensus about the correct application of the underlying norms, yielding predictable
and consistent results).
47. Cf. Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: Voter ID, 5-4? If So,
So hat?, 7 ELEcTION L.J. 63 (2008) (calling on the Supreme Court to make a special effort to
find a ground for decision in the Indiana voter ID case acceptable to liberal and conservative
Justices, so as to reaffirm the idea that the courts play a meaningfully nonpartisan role in policing
the fairness of the voting process).
48. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292-93 (2004) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.)
(arguing, contra Justice Stevens in dissent, that the doctrinal standard used to adjudicate racial
gerrymandering claims would not be manageable vis-A-vis partisan gerrymandering claims,
because of, inter alia, "the reality that setting out to segregate voters by race is ... rare, and
setting out to segregate them by political affiliation is ... ordinary.").
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partisan fires are relatively cool (especially to be avoided are judicial
rulings in the immediate aftermath of the requirement's enactment and,
even more so, post-election rulings when the election hangs in the
balance 49); and (5) it is intelligible and attractive to the general public, so
that court decisions that come under attack can be convincingly portrayed
by their defenders as sensible and lawful. It may not be possible to achieve
all of these desiderata in any one doctrinal standard, but each has evident
appeal, and none should be ignored in developing or assessing proposed
standards.
Keeping these factors in view, I wish to suggest that the courts' best
hope for adjudicating the new generation of voter participation claims lies
in an approach that minimizes (without denying entirely) the individualistic
component of the right to vote, while establishing that the aggregate pattern
of voter participation is a proper object of constitutional concern. In order
to adopt this approach, however, the Court would need a "political theory"
that privileges certain patterns of voter participation. The approach I favor
would highlight the franchise's role in maintaining the lines of
accountability contemplated by Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment,
and the role of the states as front-line regulators of the voting process.
Many others have argued that a structural understanding of the right to vote
makes sense on normative grounds.5 ° My point here is more pragmatic.
Whatever may be the best understanding of the right to vote as a matter of
first principles, a structural approach is the most plausible way to avoid
quagmire and resulting injury to the courts' reputation for reasoned,
impartial decision-making.
I shall proceed as follows. Part I provides a quick sketch of the
doctrinal terrain on which the new voter participation claims will be
adjudicated, briefly retracing the Court's path from Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 1,51 to Storer v. Brown,52 to Burdick v. Takushi.53 Part
II takes up and critiques (on manageability grounds) a reading of the
Burdick framework premised on an individualistic understanding of the
right to vote. Part III examines several approaches to Burdick that remain
49. Cf Hasen, supra note 14, at 991-99 (recommending greater use of laches to avoid post-
election, outcome-determinative judicial rulings).
50. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1099
(2005); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to
Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1217 (1999).
51. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
52. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
53. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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agnostic on the status of the right to vote as individualistic or collective in
nature. Part IV explains the manageability advantages of approaches to
Burdick that treat the right to vote as a right in service of democratic self-
government. Part V addresses the textual and doctrinal defensibility of one
such approach.
I. The Burdick Framework
It is by now well established that the right to vote on equal terms with
others is fundamental, and that no state may exclude any class of adult,
nonfelon, citizen residents from what I shall term the normative
electorate-the class of persons to whom elected officials are supposed to
be accountable.54 The holding of elections requires much more than the
definition of a normative electorate, however. Also needed are dates and
venues for voting; technologies for recording and tabulating ballots;
procedures through which would-be voters prove up their membership in
the normative electorate; and rules concerning who and what shall appear
on the ballot (to say nothing of rules that define constituencies and
aggregate votes into decisions). Many such regulations of the electoral
process may be said to burden rights of political participation, which raises
the question of whether burdens of this sort may be so onerous or
unnecessary as to be unconstitutional.
The answer to that question is clearly yes. Since the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of most "electoral
mechanics" burdens using a balancing standard." In a foundational 1974
decision, Storer v. Brown, the Court formulated the standard thus:
[There is] no litmus-paper test for separating those [electoral]
restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal
Protection Clause. [There] is no substitute for the hard judgments that must
be made. Decision in this context... is very much a matter of degree, very
much a matter of considering the facts and circumstances behind the law,
the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the classification. What the result of this
process will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with
56great assurance.
54. The leading case that establishes this principle (though not in so many words) is Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, supra. The felony exception was established a few years after
Kramer, in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
55. For an in-depth examination of this body of Supreme Court case law, see Elmendorf,
supra note 1.
56. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
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Storer was a ballot access cases, but in a later dictum the Court
indicated that Storer balancing was appropriately employed across the run
of cases about "the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection
and eligibility of candidates, [and] the voting process. 57 The framework
was subsequently refined in Burdick v. Takushi,58 where the Court provided
this instruction:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the
State as -justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into
consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff's rights.
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. [W]hen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance. But when a state election law provision
imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State's
important reulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the
restrictions.
5
Burdick furnishes the rubric within which doctrinal standards for
adjudicating voter participation claims will almost surely be developed.
And as of this writing, that rubric can support almost any standard one
wishes to project onto it. Some of this uncertainty is due to the fact that the
Court has not decided a case about barriers to the exercise of the franchise
by voting-eligible citizens since the early 1970s. 60 Almost all of the
Court's applications of the Storer-Burdick framework have concerned who
57. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). Cf Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 433 (1992) (quoting this statement from Anderson); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (distinguishing Anderson on ground that challenged ban on anonymous
political leafleting did not "control the mechanics of the electoral process," but rather was a
content-based "regulation of pure speech").
58. Burdick, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
59. Id. at 434 (internal citations and quotation marks removed).
60. This statement glosses over Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), a decision that is
arguably about barriers to the exercise of the franchise (the counting of votes cast), but whose
doctrinal import is famously obscure, and which does not even cite to Storer or Burdick, or
otherwise explain the standard of review that the Court meant to be applying.
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or what appears on the ballot, or the associational rights of political parties.
But even in these areas, basic questions about Burdick remain unanswered.
For example: Does Burdick prescribe open-ended balancing like
Storer, or does it convert the mush of Storer into a firmly two-tiered
standard of review, with one level of scrutiny for "severe" and another for
"non-severe" burdens? Judge Posner, for one, reads Burdick and
associated cases to call for open-ended balancing: "[T]he constitutional
question is whether the restriction and resulting exclusion are reasonable
given the interest the restriction serves. No greater precision in the
articulation of the governing standard seems possible.' Without
disavowing Posner's position, the Supreme Court's practice since Burdick
has been rather different. The Court almost always characterizes the
burden at issue as "severe" or "minor" and then applies strict scrutiny or
lenient review as appropriate.62
Following the Court's practice, many lower courts have read Burdick
to prescribe two-tier review, with strict scrutiny for severe burdens and
something else for lesser ones. But what is this something else? Is it
meaningfully different from the ordinary rational basis test? Again, the
Court has not addressed this. The Court has, however, upheld assertedly
non-severe restrictions on the basis of hypothetical parades of horribles,
albeit without using the magic words "rational basis" or citing to the iconic
rational basis precedents.63 As if to call a spade a spade, a few lower courts
have applied rationality review to non-severe burdens.64 Others have
vehemently rejected the proposition that any burden on fundamental rights
of voting and political association must be sustained if hypothetically
rational.65
61. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004).
62. See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 330-76.
63. See id. at 330 n.66 (describing "de facto rational basis" review under Burdick).
64. See, e.g., Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 485 (1st Cir. 1996) ("defendants need only
show that the enactment of the regulation had a rational basis," given that the burden at issue is
"slight"); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("[T]he
appropriate inquiry is whether the Photo ID requirement is rationally related to the interest the
State seeks to further.").
65. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elec., 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "a regulation which imposes only moderate burdens could well fail the Anderson
balancing test when the interests that it serves are minor, notwithstanding that the regulation is
rational," and disagreeing with decisions by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits that the McLaughlin
court read as applications of the rational basis test); Reform Party of Allegheny County v.
Allegheny County Dep't of Elec., 174 F.3d 305, 314-15 (3d. Cir. 1999) (striking down a ban on
cross-endorsements by minor parties after applying an "intermediate level of scrutiny"); Cotham
v. Garza, 905 F. Supp. 389, 398-401 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that "limited, not severe"
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Of all the open questions under Burdick, the most important for
purposes of the new voter participation claims is how to characterize the
severity of barriers to the casting of valid, properly counted ballots. A
quick survey of the approaches that lower courts have taken in
characterizing the burden of voter ID requirements is enough to reveal the
thoroughly unsettled state of the law. Some judges have evaluated voter ID
burdens in terms of their consequences for voter turnout; the best example
is Posner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Crawford.66 Other judges
have linked burden severity to a normative conception of what the state
may reasonably expect of citizens who wish to vote. Burdens not
exceeding what the reasonable voter can reasonably bear are de minimis as
a matter of law. Any corresponding exclusion is said to be the voter's
fault, and not of constitutional moment.67 Still other judges have tied
administrative restrictions on the right to vote may not be sustained without a showing of
necessity).
66. When adjudicating constitutional challenges to an ID requirement for voting, Posner
wrote, a judge must weigh "the effect of requiring... ID in inducing eligible voters to
disfranchise themselves," against the number of instances of impersonation fraud that the ID
requirement successfully prevents. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953-54. Judge Posner emphasized in
upholding the law that "the plaintiffs have not shown that there are fewer impersonations than
there are eligible voters whom the new law will prevent from voting." Id.
Several other judges presiding over voter ID lawsuits have emphasized consequences for turnout
in their rulings, although none has been as single-minded about this as Posner. For example, the
district judge in ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes, No. Civ. 05-1136, 2007 WL 782167
(D.N.M. Feb. 12, 2007), entered a preliminary injunction against the City of Albuquerque's photo
ID requirement after finding that "surprise or confusion about the.., requirement and the
bureaucratic hurdles it imposes is likely to discourage-if not disenfranchise-a significant
number of Albuquerque voters ... on the next municipal election day." Id. at *31; see also
Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In characterizing as
severe the burden of Georgia's first photo ID requirement for voting, the court wrote that it would
"prevent [many of] Georgia's elderly, poor, and African-American voters from voting," and
speculated that the availability of absentee voting (for which no ID was required) wouldn't cure
the problem because "[t]he majority of voters-particularly those voters who lack Photo ID-
would not plan sufficiently enough ahead to vote via absentee ballot successfully." Id. at 1364-
65. It should be noted, however, that there are non-consequential strains in both of these
opinions, and that the court in the Georgia litigation subsequently adopted an individualistic,
"reasonable voter" approach. See infra note 67.
67. This "reasonable voter" approach is nicely illustrated by the latest opinion in the federal
litigation over Georgia's photo ID requirement for voting. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups,
504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The district court determined that the burden of
Georgia's requirement simply was not "appreciable," given (1) that Georgia authorized no-
excuses absentee voting, without ID; (2) that Georgia made free voter-ID cards available to any
registered voter who needed one, and who came forward with minimal documentary evidence of
his or her identity; and (3) that Georgia had made "exceptional efforts" to contact voters who
lacked state-issued driver's licenses and inform them of the new requirement. Id. at 1377-80.
Under these circumstances, any eligible voter who failed to cast a valid ballot had only himself to
blame. For other illustrations of this analytic approach, see Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514,
1524-25 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying lenient review to 20-day advance registration requirement,
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scrutiny levels to the apparent purpose behind the ID requirement (was it
meant to exclude certain voters because of the way they may vote?); 68 the
form that the burden takes (is the ID requirement fairly analogized to an
express financial condition on the franchise?); 69 or the discretion vested in
pollworkers (is the ID requirement likely to result in arbitrarily disparate
treatment of similarly situated voters?).7 °
If the law is to have normative coherence, the question of how the
Burdick framework applies to voter participation claims cannot be divorced
from the question of what is the proper judicial stance toward the nature of
the right to vote. If it is proper for courts to treat the right to vote as
individual and personal in nature, that will have one set of implications for
characterizing the severity of burdens on the franchise. If the courts should
remain studiously agnostic on the nature of the right to vote, that will have
another set of implications. And if the right to vote is a right in service of a
collective interest in legitimate or duly accountable government, that will
have still other implications. Notice, though, that the lines of causation
could also run the other way. Given an array of plausible understandings
of the proper judicial stance toward the right to vote, the courts might
choose among them on the basis of the feasibility of crafting manageable
rules for decision consistent with that understanding.7 To that end, the
balance of this essay examines the manageability problems that are likely
reasoning that voters were "disenfranchised by their willful or negligent failure to register on
time"); ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs'
evidence showing that elimination of Connecticut's 14-day advance registration requirement
would increase the rate of voter participation by 5.5 percent was beside the point, since modest
registration requirements simply do not constitute "severe" burdens); Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F.
Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that state rules that merely require voters to "act
promptly" in requesting and returning absentee ballots constitute a "light" imposition).
68. Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in Crawford, Judge
Diane Wood proposed: "[W]hen there is a serious risk that an election law has been passed with
the intent of imposing an additional significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of
voters, the court must apply strict scrutiny." 484 F.3d 436, 437 (2007).
69. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1366-70 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (holding
that first version of Georgia's photo ID requirement for voting was tantamount to a poll tax
because the state charged fees for the one form of qualifying ID it made available to all citizens);
Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 213-14 (Mo. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny, pursuant to
state-law version of the severe/lesser burden test, because, inter alia, "[the] Photo ID requirement
requires payment of money to exercise the right to vote").
70. Santillanes, 2007 WL 782167, at *25-28 (suggesting that disparate treatment of even a
"small percentage" of voters, pursuant to a vague standard regarding what forms of ID qualify for
voting purposes, may be enough to trigger strict scrutiny).
71. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) (extending previous work of Daryl
Levinson and others concerning the impact of remedial options on the definition of rights).
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to arise--or be avoided-on competing understandings of the proper
judicial stance toward the nature of the right to vote.
II. Applying Burdick: The Model of Individual Rights
Perhaps the most straightforward way of fleshing out the Burdick test
is to assess burden severity in terms of the practical barriers to the exercise
of the franchise confronted by individual citizen-plaintiffs who wish to
vote. On this view, a voting requirement creates a "severe" burden within
the meaning of Burdick if it represents a substantial impediment to voting
for some citizens but not for others. A showing of differential hardship is
required because the right to vote as such is not fundamental; rather, what
the Constitution has been held to protect is the right to vote on equal terms
with others.72 One other caveat is necessary to round out the model: if the
voter could have surmounted the barrier at issue through the exercise of
reasonable civic diligence, the burden he now faces shall not be deemed
severe-even if the voter is wholly excluded from the upcoming election.73
Thus, a voter who fails to register in time will not be granted an exemption
from a modest advance registration requirement; his failure to register
promptly will be chalked up to civic lassitude.74 I shall call this approach
the individual-right/practical-barrier gloss on Burdick.
This approach would seem to follow almost axiomatically from the
premise that the right to vote on equal terms with others is a personal,
72. In the 1960s, Justices Douglas, Fortas, and Warren took the view that the right to vote
was fundamental as such, and that certain legislative and gubernatorial offices therefore had to be
made elective. See, e.g., Fortson v. Morriss, 385 U.S. 231, 242 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
But the distinction between legislative and non-legislative offices was rejected as unworkable in
Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474 (1968), and Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro
Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), and since then the Equal Protection Clause has been the
root of most of the constitutional right-to-vote jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (explaining that strict scrutiny must be applied to
statutes that "distribut[e] the franchise" to some citizens while "denying [it] to [other] citizens
who are otherwise qualified by residence and age.").
73. This caveat is suggested by several Supreme Court decisions from the early 1970s. See,
e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973) ("if [the petitioners'] plight can be
characterized as disenfranchisement at all, it was not caused by [the state's advance enrollment
requirement], but by their own failure to take timely steps to effect their enrollment"); Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (striking down a longer advance enrollment requirement, which
prevented the diligent plaintiff from voting in her new political party's primary). Cf. O'Brien v.
Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 537 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's decision
finding unconstitutional a state's failure to provide absentee ballots to pre-trial detainees
incarcerated outside their county of residence, because the plaintiffs "were in jail through their
own doing, just as the petitioners in Rosario v. Rockefeller... found themselves unable to vote
because of their failure to meet an enrollment deadline").
74. See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 758.
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individuated right, akin to privacy rights or liberty of conscience.75 Just as
a state's decision to ban a particular technique for conducting pre-viability
abortions, for example, is presumed to be unconstitutional vis-A-vis any
woman for whom the permitted abortion procedures would pose a
significant health risk (relative to the banned procedure), 76 so too is the
state's decision to mandate a particular voting protocol (thereby "banning"
others) unconstitutional vis-A-vis any citizen for whom compliance would
entail unusual hardships due to personal circumstances for which the voter
cannot be faulted, such as a medical condition. Once the showing of
significant and differential hardship has been made, the statute as written
can be applied to the plaintiff-voters only if it passes strict scrutiny.
This model has many attractions. Most prominently, a holding that
"burden severity" within the meaning of Burdick is a function of the size of
the hurdle faced by the plaintiff-voter, relative to the size of the hurdle
faced by others, would reconcile the Storer-Burdick framework with
foundational voting rights precedents like Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 1577 and Dunn v. Blumstein,78 in which the Court applied strict
scrutiny to state laws that categorically denied the franchise to some
citizens while extending it to others. The more cumbersome and difficult
an administrative requirement is for certain citizens to comply with, the
75. Cf Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964)
(analogizing the right to vote to the right to be free from compelled speech, and the right to "life,
liberty, and property... and other fundamental rights").
76. In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the Court's latest abortion decision,
both the majority and the dissent agreed that an abortion restriction creates an "undue burden"
within the meaning of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), if
it results in a serious health risk for a single woman. The dissent states this explicitly. Thus, in
discussing the Casey plurality's statement that an abortion restriction is unduly burdensome if"in
a large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion," the dissent asserts: "[T]he numerator and
denominator are the same: The health exception reaches only those cases where a woman's health
is at risk. Perhaps for this reason, in mandating safeguards for women's health, we have never
before invoked the 'large fraction' test." Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 n.10 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). The Gonzales majority's embrace of the idea that a
significant health risk to even one woman is enough to trigger strict scrutiny (and then a remedial
exemption) is implicit in the majority's admonition that "the proper means to consider exceptions
[to a ban on an abortion procedure] is by as-applied challenge" "in a discrete case." Id. at 1638-
39. (It should be noted that Gonzales's prescription for fact-specific, as-applied adjudication of
abortion-rights claims represents a departure from the lower courts' practice in the Casey era. Cf.
Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 421, 459-83 (2007)
(reviewing and criticizing lower court decisions for failing to take into account the particular
circumstances of rural women in gauging the "burden" of mandatory waiting periods and other
abortion restrictions)).
77. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969).
78. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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more that requirement resembles a categorical denial of the franchise to the
most burdened citizens. It may be said to follow from Kramer and Dunn
that these heavily burdened citizens are owed an exemption, unless the
state establishes that its voting requirement is narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling state interest.
Second, adoption of the individual-right/practical-barrier model could
help to lower the stakes of litigation over the most controversial of the new
voting rules, the photo ID requirements. To illustrate, consider Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board,79 the constitutional challenge to Indiana's
photo ID requirement for voting presently before the Court. The Indiana
Democratic Party brought this case as a facial challenge, asking the federal
courts to rule Indiana's photo ID law valid or invalid in its entirety. The
lower courts accepted the case in this posture and ruled accordingly. But
when the case reached the Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General
intervened to argue that it should be dismissed as an improper facial
challenge.80 Under United States v. Salerno,"' the SG observed, a facial
challenge must fail unless the plaintiff "establish[es] that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.,8 2  Because
Indiana's photo ID requirement imposes virtually no burden at all on the
voter who shows up at the polls with his driver's license in his pocket, the
plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Salerno standard, and their facial challenge
must be dismissed. The SG acknowledged at oral argument that the
Indiana requirement might well be unconstitutional as applied to an
indigent voter who was unable to obtaining qualifying ID without payment
of a fee. 3 But, he continued, the proper way to consider that question is in
the context of an as-applied challenge by such a voter.84 Moreover-and
very importantly-the presumptive remedy in such a case would be a
tailored exemption for the unduly burdened voter or voters, not an
injunction against enforcement of the law altogether. As the Department of
Justice's brief put it:
79. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted
128 S.Ct. 33 (2007).
80. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-18,
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., _ U.S. _ (Nos. 07-21 & 07-25) (2008) (hereinafter
SG 's Brie).
81. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
82. Id. at 745.
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52-53, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., __ U.S.
- (Nos. 07-21 & 07-25) (hereinafter Transcript).
84. Id. at 53-58.
If, as petitioners contend, [the Indiana voter ID requirement] is
unconstitutional as applied to a homeless person... because he is
unable to obtain a BMV-issued ID card ... , then a narrow[] remedy
would be to enjoin BMV from denying an ID on the ground that a
person has no address, or to enjoin the [state] from a collecting a
search fee for birth certificates in that circumstance.
85
Over a series of cases, then, the courts could use the individual-
right/practical-barrier gloss on Burdick to trim away the most egregious
features of the new voting requirements, without ever passing on the basic
legitimacy of Republicans' preferred techniques for combating voter fraud.
This is no doubt attractive for judges who would like to avoid a head-on
clash with a major political party over one of the party's top legislative
priorities.
86
A third attraction of the individual-right/practical-barrier model lies in
the promise it may hold for bridging ideological differences. The model
seems to have normative appeal across the political spectrum. On the
conservative side, the model undergirds the amicus brief and oral argument
of the Republican Solicitor General in Crawford (an argument that was
well received by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts). On the left, the
model was applied by Democratic appointee and district judge Harold
Murphy in upholding Georgia's photo ID requirement for voting,87 and
seemed to inform Justice Ginsburg's questioning at oral argument in
Crawford.88 Indeed, reading between the lines, one can see the model at
work in the Crawford amicus brief of stalwart liberal Erwin Chemerinsky,
who argued that any state law that operates to "completely deny" the right
to vote to any voting-age citizen must be subjected to strict scrutiny. 89 And
then there is Justice Kennedy, the presumptive swing vote on so many
issues, whose previous writings make clear that he thinks the burden of a
voting requirement should be assessed from the point of view of those
85. SG's Brief, supra note 80, at 16.
86. It should be noted, however, that successful as-applied challenges do not always result in
narrow remedies. Per Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320,
329-30 (2006), the court must ask whether the application of the statute to the plaintiffs may be
severed, or whether severance would entail improper judicial "rewriting [of] state law" or be
contrary to the legislature's wishes.
87. See supra note 67.
88. See Transcript, supra note 83, at 14-16, 48-49, 52-55 (focusing on the particular burden
on certain indigent voters allegedly created by the Indiana photo ID law).
89. Brief of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., _ U.S. _ (Nos. 07-21 & 07-25).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:4
UNDUE BURDENS ON VOTER PARTICIPATION
voters whom it affects most harshly.90 Given this confluence of opinion, it
is not unreasonable to think that the individual-right/practical-barrier model
could anchor a substantially unanimous Supreme Court opinion
establishing new guidelines for voter participation litigation.
Notice too that on a certain view of the adjudicative process, the
individual-right/practical-barrier model might enable the bridging of
ideological differences not only on the model's correctness in principle, but
also on its application to particular facts. It is part of the lore of U.S. legal
practice that the experience of adjudicating cases premised on
particularistic facts can cleanse a judge of her initial ideological prejudices.
And whether or not so cleansed, liberal and conservative jurists who would
not see eye to eye if asked to gauge whether a given voting requirement is
reasonable overall (in the sense that its benefits outweigh its costs) may
nonetheless agree that an exemption for some narrowly defined class of
voters for whom compliance is particularly difficult would improve the
cost-benefit balance. By orienting constitutional adjudication toward the
creation of such exemptions, the individual-right/practical-barrier model
may foster trans-ideological judicial compromise.
Notwithstanding these attractions, the individual-right/practical-barrier
model should be rejected by any judge who worries about debilitating
90. Consider his dissent from the Court's decision to uphold Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 434 (1992). The majority conceptualized write-in voting as an
alternative means of ballot access for independent candidates and third parties. Because Hawaii's
principal channels for ballot access were constitutionally adequate, the majority reasoned, the
constitutional burden of the write-in voting ban was necessarily minor. See Id. at 438-39.
Kennedy saw the restriction rather differently: "fflor those voters affected," he wrote, the ban
operates as a "total" infringement on "the right to vote for the candidate of their choice." Id. at
447 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Time and again, Kennedy's choice of phrasing
manifests his individualistic take on the nature of the right to vote. See id. at 446 ("I submit the
conclusion [regarding the "character and magnitude" of the burden on constitutionally protected
rights] must be that the write-in ban deprives some voters of any substantial voice in selecting
candidates for the entire range of offices at issue in a particular election.") (emphasis added); id.
("some voters cannot vote for the candidate of their choice without a write-in option") (emphasis
added); id. ("a write-in ballot permits a voter to effectively exercise his individual constitutionally
protected franchise") (quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 987 (S.D. Ohio
1968)) (emphasis added); id. at 448 ("The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and
significant burden a write-in ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing them from
exercising their right to vote in a meaningful manner.... In my view, a State that bans write-in
voting in some or all elections must justify the burden on individual voters by putting forth the
precise interests that are served by the ban.") (emphasis added); id. ("Hawaii's write-in ban...
imposes a significant burden on voters such as petitioner.") (emphasis added). Kenendy's
individualistic take on the right to vote comports with his general view that the protection of
fundamental individual liberties is the Court's foremost responsibility. See generally Helen J.
Knowles, From A Value to a Right: The Supreme Court's Oh-So-Conscious Move from 'Privacy'
to 'Liberty,' 33 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 595, 607-20 (2007) (surveying Justice Kennedy's "liberties"
jurisprudence).
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judicial entanglement in partisan political conflict. The model threatens the
Court's long-held premise that "[i]t is very unlikely that all or even a large
portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our
cases." 9' To see why, consider the following hypotheticals:
* A working mother challenges the state's failure to include "working
mothers" among the classes of citizens authorized to vote
absentee. 92 The plaintiff alleges that in-person voting is vastly more
burdensome for her than it is for the typical citizen, due to her
extraordinary child care and employment responsibilities. Just as a
woman whose unusual medical condition puts her at special risk
from the statutorily authorized abortion procedure must be allowed
to use a banned procedure that would be much safer for her, so too,
the plaintiff says, must the state allow absentee voting by a citizen
whose unusual life circumstances make in-person voting
exceptionally difficult. In the alternative, the plaintiff requests a
court order moving Election Day to a weekend, or requiring the
state to establish "early voting" sites for in-person voting before
Election Day.
* A Native American citizen who cannot read English brings suit
challenging the state's failure to print ballots in her native language.
There are few members of her language group in the locality in
question, so the jurisdiction faces no obligation to provide voting
materials in translation pursuant to the Voting Rights Act (VRA).93
Nonetheless, the plaintiff insists that because the right to vote is an
individual right, strict scrutiny must be applied to the state's failure
to provide her with a translated ballot, given that voting an English-
language ballot is impractical for her, through no fault of her own.
(For a variation on this theme, imagine a suit brought by a limited-
91. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
92. Cf. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim of working
mothers).
93. Under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, states and political subdivisions must
provide voting materials in translation if the jurisdiction's voting-age population of Latino, Asian
American, Native American, or Native Alaskans (of a single language group) is equal to or
greater than 10,000 or 5 percent of the voting age population, and the language minority's
illiteracy rate is higher than the national average. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A). For a
useful overview of the VRA's language-minority protections, see Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, !Su
Voto Es Su Voz! Incorporating Voters of Limited English Proficiency into American Democracy,
48 B.C. L. REv. 251, 270-74 (2007).
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English-proficiency voter whose language group is not protected by
the VRA.)
" A voter who had to wait in line for more than forty-five minutes to
cast a ballot brings suit seeking a declaratory judgment (1) that the
state must purchase and implement new computer technology that
would notify voters upon arriving at the polling place of their
expected waiting time; and (2) that the state must furnish absentee
ballots to those voters who face a projected line of more than forty-
five minutes, and count all such absentee ballots postmarked by the
day after Election Day. The plaintiff insists that forty-five minutes
is just too long to expect a reasonable citizen to wait before voting,
especially when some citizens face no wait at all.
" Imagine that Congress decides to weaken the Help America Vote
Act's protections for voters with disabilities. Congress replaces the
current mandate-that states provide "at least one direct recording
electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for
individuals with disabilities at each polling place" 94 -with a
requirement that states do this or set up early voting centers, at a
distance of no more than twenty miles from one another, with
similarly accessible voting machines. A blind voter brings suit,
arguing that the nearest early voting center is not accessible to him
because it would require a long trip by public transit or a costly cab
fare, whereas previously he, like most other voters, was able to vote
at a precinct within walking distance of his home.
* A resident of a remote, sparsely populated ranching community,
whose home is thirty miles along bad roads from the nearest polling
place, brings suit seeking a right to vote absentee. "At the very
least," she says, "I should be entitled to vote absentee in elections
held during calving season."
Common to these scenarios is the following: (1) due to fortuities of
her life circumstances and the state's mandated procedures for voting, the
plaintiff-voter must incur substantially greater costs than the average
citizen in order to cast a valid, properly counted ballot; (2) the voter is not
civically negligent-she cannot reasonably be faulted for the circumstances
that make it difficult for her to use the available means of voting; (3) there
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15481(a)(3)(C).
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is little basis other than the judge's personal sense of justice upon which to
found a determination that the plaintiffs burden is so much greater than
that faced by the typical voter as to warrant classification as "severe"; and
(4) the plaintiffs as-applied claim cannot be vindicated without an
intrusive remedy. In granting relief, the courts would be requiring the state
to print ballots in new languages; to expand the class of persons entitled to
vote absentee; to establish an in-person "early voting" option; to change the
date of Election Day; or to purchase and implement costly, new-fangled
voting technologies.
It follows that if a severe barrier to participation for any given voter
(relative to the barriers faced by typical voters) is enough to trigger strict
scrutiny of the challenged voting requirement, the courts will either need to
assume responsibility for micromanaging the details of election
administration, or to set an extremely high severity threshold. And the
latter would surely meet with fierce resistance from liberal judges if the
individual-right/practical-barrier model is to be the exclusive means of
policing the constitutionality of voting requirements. The prospect of such
resistance may be enough to make a high severity threshold seem
"unmanageable" to the very conservatives Justices who believe it correct
on the merits. Strenuous dissents from the liberal Justices could be enough
to make the conservative position appear partisan (with a capital R) to
onlookers even if it is in fact principled, and serve to discredit the standard
in the eyes of the lower court judges charged with applying it.
It should be apparent, too, that the individual-right/practical-barrier
model rests on a dramatic leap of faith concerning the likelihood that
particularistic facts will dislodge judges from their ideological habits and
enable judicial agreement about the severity of the associated burden. Here
and there, appellate courts may be able to craft bright-line rules to settle
disputes over burden severity (for example, concerning maximum waiting
times at polling stations). But if the substance of the burden test is whether
the challenged voting requirement makes participation substantially
burdensome for her, bright-line rules will be few and far between. Given
that liberal and conservative judges are likely to approach the burden
question with very different normative intuitions-most especially about
matters like voter fault and civic responsibility95 -there would remain
95. Compare the different attitudes of liberal and conservative judges toward asserted "voter
fault" in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974);
and Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot by 473 F.3d 692 (6th
Cir. 2007). Note also Justice O'Connor's telling exasperation, during oral argument in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), at the failure of certain Florida voters to fully "punch through" the
chad on punch-card ballots. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush, at 57-58 ("Well, why isn't
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considerable cause for concern about partisanship or its appearance in
judicial decision-making. A doctrine that makes scrutiny levels highly
dependent on the judge's own normative intuitions seems to this writer ill
advised for an election law domain in which jurisprudential intuitions and
partisan interests coincide.
Fortunately, the doctrinally settled premise that the right to vote is, at
least in part, an individual right does not compel the practical-barrier gloss
on Burdick. The Court has remarked that the right to vote signifies the
would-be elector's status as a full member of the political community.
96
One could argue, then, that burdens on the franchise incidental to the
state's pursuit of legitimate election administration goals, such as fraud
prevention, are of no constitutional concern unless they are so pointlessly
extreme as to manifest willful indifference to the voter's status as a
member of the normative electorate. Going further, one could insist that
"severe" harms to the individualist/dignitary interest protected by the right
to vote arise only if the exclusionary regulation at issue (1) purports to
define the normative electorate, rather than to advance election
administration values like convenience, affordability, security, or
conclusiveness, or (2) facially discriminates on impermissible grounds
(e.g., assigning Democrats to one voting technology and Republicans to
another). Some such circumscribed understanding of the individual right to
vote is probably for the best if the courts are to avoid excessive and
essentially standardless entanglement in the nuts and bolts of the voting
process. Again, however, it is extremely difficult to imagine liberal judges
acceding to so parsimonious a conception of the individual right unless
voting is acknowledged to have other, non-dignitary functions that the
courts may protect in other ways.
III. Applying Burdick: The Agnostic Models
As one might expect from the Court's oft-stated position that it has no
"political theory" about voting, it is possible to implement the Burdick
the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't
be clearer. I mean, why don't we go to that standard?") (emphasis added).
96. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) ("[t]o the extent that a citizen's
right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen"). Cf Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government"). See also James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA.
L. REv. 893 (1997) (arguing that the expressive/membership conception of the right to vote has
had much more influence over the Supreme Court's constitutional voting rights decisions than the
Court overtly acknowledges).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
framework without expressly adopting an individualistic or a structural
conception of voting. This Part examines three prominent approaches to
Burdick that are compatible with an agnostic stance toward the status of the
right to vote: purpose tests, under which the level-of-scrutiny-determining
question is the apparent reason for the challenged requirement's enactment;
reasonable tailoring on a requirement-by-requirement basis, under which
the constitutionality of voting rules turns on an all-things-considered
assessment of whether the law is reasonably designed to advance legitimate
objectives without creating unnecessary barriers participation; and
judicially prescribed mandates on a class-of-requirements basis, whereby
the courts undertake to specify features that certain kinds of voting
requirements must have in order to qualify as presumptively permissible.
These strategies are agnostic in the sense that they can be
implemented without judicial specification of the values that the right to
vote is supposed to protect. Further, they can function as indirect ways of
protecting both dignitary/individualistic and structural/collective interests,
and in this sense they may facilitate agreement among judges who come to
the bench with different conceptions of the right to vote. The strategies
discussed below are also prominent, in that they have been promoted by
leading scholars or judges, and have a footing in Supreme Court
precedents.
A. Purpose Tests
In Carrington v. Rash,97 the Supreme Court held that no state may
exclude a citizen from the normative electorate "because of the way [he]
may vote. 98 Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's denial of rehearing en
banc in Crawford, Judge Diane Wood similarly posited: "[W]hen there is a
serious risk that an election law has been passed with the intent of imposing
an additional significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of
voters, the court must apply strict scrutiny."
99
Such purpose tests are compatible with both individualistic and
structural understandings of the right to vote. At the personal level, the
challenged law may be said to disrespect the voter's prerogative to form
her own political views and to participate in the electoral process free from
state-created impediments that target her because of those views. At the
collective level, a voting requirement that was enacted for viewpoint-
97. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
98. Id. at 94.
99. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007).
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discriminatory reasons may be presumed to have distortionary effects on
the political demographics of voter participation.' 00
Purpose tests do not, however, offer a judicially manageable means of
policing the constitutionality of the new voting requirements. Partisan-
exclusionary purposes may not be legitimate, but they are unavoidably
pervasive when party-affiliated lawmakers undertake to reform the ground
rules of electoral competition. If election laws are not to be found
unconstitutional whenever enacted by a substantially party-line vote of the
legislature, a court applying a motive or purpose test must differentiate
between "but for" and "predominant" partisan motives, and reserve strict
scrutiny only for those laws that are infected by extreme or excessive
partisanship. But the line between extreme and ordinary partisan motives
is next to impossible to draw, 101 except perhaps on the basis of the judge's
subjective assessment of the law's merits. (If the judge finds the law
wholly indefensible, she will conclude that partisan motives thoroughly
overwhelmed the good judgment of the legislators who enacted the law.)
And if purpose tests invariably devolve into substantive assessments of the
law's reasonableness, what is gained by affixing the incendiary label,
"illegitimate purpose"?
A further and perhaps even more daunting problem with partisan-
purpose tests is that they would invite attention to any pattern of
partisanship in the courts' own decision-making. It is bad enough that the
courts have split along partisan lines in evaluating whether photo ID
requirements excessively burden the right to vote. It would be that much
worse if these split decisions turned overtly on whether the legislature acted
for impermissible partisan reasons. Notably, not one Justice suggested
during the Crawford oral argument that partisan motives were germane to
the Indiana law's constitutionality-notwithstanding that the State's voter
ID requirement was enacted on a straight party-line vote, that it appears to
be the strictest of its kind in the nation, and that the Supreme Court has
held it impermissible to exclude a citizen from the franchise because of the
way he may vote. That principle is sound, but it is not one the courts can
practicably enforce with holdings founded on the partisan purpose behind a
requirement's enactment.
B. Reasonable Tailoring on a Requirement-by-Requirement Basis
Several law professors, myself included, filed amicus briefs in
Crawford arguing that the Indiana photo ID requirement should not be
100. See Elmendorf supra note 1, at 364-66.
101. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Summer 2008] UNDUE BURDENS ON VOTER PARTICIPATION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
upheld unless found to be reasonably necessary to advance important state
interests. 0 2  By shifting attention from the ultimate consequences of
Indiana's law to its apparent necessity (in light of voter-verification
practices elsewhere and other readily imagined alternatives), this mode of
analysis would allow the courts to dodge ultimate questions about the
purpose of the right to vote.
I increasingly worry, however, that the Supreme Court's embrace of
this approach would do little to reduce the appearance of partisanship in
future judicial decisions. "Reasonable tailoring" is in the eye of the
beholder. This is well illustrated by the Indiana photo ID requirement.
Accepting that Indiana has a legitimate interest in verifying voters' identity,
one might say that the State's ID requirement is not reasonably necessary
to advance this interest because it appears more restrictive than the voter ID
protocols in use in every other state.10 3 On the other hand, a showing of
government-issued photo ID has become de rigueur for many identity-
sensitive activities in private life; from this perspective, Indiana's new
voting requirement is just an unexceptional effort on the part of the State to
catch up with developments in the private sector.104 The skeptic will
respond that even if photo ID requirements for voting are not unreasonable
as such, Indiana's law is not reasonably tailored to prevent fraud because it
exempts absentee voters, and absentee voting fraud by all accounts is a
bigger problem than in-person voter impersonation. 0 5 The proponent will
say that absentee voting fraud cannot practicably be countered with a photo
ID requirement; different problems require different solutions. 10 6  The
skeptic next points out that Indiana's statute features a very cumbersome
accommodation for indigent voters who cannot obtain ID without payment
of a fee and persons with a religious objection to being photographed.'
0 7
These citizens may vote before Election Day at the county clerk's office in
the county seat, or they may vote a provisional ballot at their normal
polling station on Election Day-but the provisional ballot will only count
if the voter makes a second trip within 10 days to complete an
102. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Christopher S. Elmendorf & Daniel P. Tokaji in Support of
Petitioners, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., _ U.S. _ (Nos. 07-21 & 07-25)
(hereinafter Elmendorf& Tokaji Brie]); Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Rick Hasen in Support
of Petitioners,. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., _ U.S. _ (Nos. 07-21 & 07-25)
(hereinafter Hasen Brie]).
103. See Elmendorf& Tokaji Brief, supra note 102, at 30-32.
104. See Debate, Voter ID: What's At Stake?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 241, 244
(2007) (Opening Statement of Bradley A. Smith).
105. See, e.g., Hasen Brief, supra note 102, at 7.
106. See, e.g., Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953.
107. See, e.g., Elmendorf& Tokaji Brief supra note 102, at 15-19.
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indigency/religious-objector affidavit at the county clerk's office or
election board. 10 8 Can the state's failure to make this affidavit available at
the polling place truly be said to be reasonably necessary to an important
state interest? Perhaps: the law's proponents respond that this arrangement
minimizes lines at the polling place, and also serves the state's interest in
an uncomplicated and hence easily administered system of election law (by
consolidating all verification of provisional ballots in specialist fora). 09
At the end of the day, whether one sees the Indiana voter identification
regime as reasonably necessary to important state interests probably
depends on what one thinks about the bona fides of political coalition
behind its enactment, or on unstated assumptions about its likely effects
and the manner in which one values those effects. Precisely because of
this, there's little reason to think that a reasonable tailoring standard would
be applied in a consistent manner by liberal and conservative judges.
All this is subject to an important caveat. While consistent application
of the reasonable necessity standard seems unlikely to be achieved by trial
judges acting individually or three-judge panels of the federal circuit
courts, the standard might be implemented rather more successfully if
defined in procedural or institutional terms. For example, a voting
requirement could be said to fail the reasonable necessity test if and only if
an ideologically diverse and well informed body of disinterested observers
agreed, by supermajority, that it was beyond the pale. 110
This is not how constitutional questions about election law are
resolved today, but it is conceivable that the courts could be pressured from
below to apply the reasonable necessity standard in accordance with the
decisions of such a body. In the hopes of creating similar bottom-up
pressure for broadly acceptable decisions in politically fraught litigation
post-election litigation, Edward Foley has recommended the formation of
bipartisan "shadow courts" that would submit amicus briefs with proposed
rulings in litigation where the winner hangs in the balance."1 If Foley's
shadow courts were to prove their mettle in that context, they might well
facilitate the adoption and implementation of the reasonable necessity
108. Brief of State Respondents at 57-59, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., __ U.S.
(Nos. 07-21, 07-25).
109. Id.
110. Cf Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676
(2007) (proposing that Chevron deference be institutionalized via supermajoritarian judicial
voting rules rather than a doctrine instructing judges to defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of statutes).
11. Edward B. Foley, A Model Court for Contested Elections (Or, the "Field of Dreams"
Approach to Election Law Reform), Moritz College of Law, Election Law & Moritz, June 19,
2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=157.
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standard in constitutional challenges to allegedly burdensome conditions on
voter participation. It would, however, be quite a step for the Supreme
Court to announce that the presumptive constitutional status of challenged
voting requirements depends on the judgment of a privately established
advisory body.
C. Judicially Prescribed Mandates on a Class-of-Requirements Basis
A third agnostic strategy for implementing Burdick is to categorize
challenged requirements as presumptively permissible or presumptively
impermissible ("severe") on the basis of whether the requirement features
certain judicially proscribed or judicially mandated terms. The proscription
strategy, at least, is quite common in the Court's election law
jurisprudence, and it well serves the agnostic jurist by enabling her to
conceal the normative judgments and empirical suppositions that motivate
particular holdings. Leading examples include the Harper line of cases, in
which the Court established that no state may expressly condition political
participation upon ownership of property or payment of a fee;1 '2 Marston v.
Lewis' 1 3 and Burns v. Fortson,'1 4 in which the Court held that fifty days
"approaches the outer constitutional limits" of permissible advance-
registration requirements for voting in general elections; 1 5 and Kusper v.
Pontikes,'1 6 in which the Court said that advance-enrollment requirements
for voting in partisan primaries go too far if the advance period is longer
than the interval of time between primary elections. 11
7
Perhaps inspired by these precedents, Edward Foley has argued that
the Supreme Court should dispose of Crawford by holding that photo ID
requirements are constitutionally permissible only if they include a general
purpose hardship exception.18 I am skeptical, however, that new judicially
prescribed mandates can be used to regularize the adjudication of voter ID
challenges or many of the other "new vote denial"" 9 claims. The sheer
112. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see also Hill v. Stone, 421
U.S. 289 (1975); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969).
113. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
114. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
115. Id. at 687.
116. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
117. On this interpretation of Kusper, see Elmendorf supra note 1, at 353-57.
118. See Debate, Voter ID: What's At Stake?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 241, 247-51
(2007) (Rebuttal by Edward B. Foley); Foley, supra note 47, at 78-79.
119. I borrow this phrase from Professor Dan Tokaji. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689 (2006).
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variety of regulations now subject to challenge is too great, and many will
resist classification on the basis of formal distinctions.
Foley's proposed hardship exemption for photo ID requirements
illustrates the point. Even if, as Foley hopes, the liberal and conservative
wings of the Court were to agree that such laws are permissible only if they
feature a hardship exemption, it would probably be a compromise for one
day only. Before long, plaintiffs would be back in court arguing that this or
that hardship exemption is unreasonable or discriminatory because it is
unnecessarily cumbersome, or because it defines hardship too stringently,
or because it vests too much discretion in election officials to pass on
whether a particular voter's hardship is severe enough to qualify for the
exemption.12  Agreement in principle on the requirement of a hardship
exemption is unlikely to yield agreement on the particulars, particularly in
view of the different attitudes toward voter fault that liberal and
conservative jurists bring to the table. And Foley's constitutional standard
for evaluating these particulars--do they "reasonab[ly] accommodate[e]
the interests on both sides"12 '-requires that judges make the very policy
determination that has divided liberals and conservatives in the legislative
arena.
The Supreme Court's adoption of Foley's proposal would also lead to
problems in the lower courts. Constitutional challenges to voter ID
requirements are part of a larger wave of voter participation claims. A
decree from the Supreme Court on the exemption necessary to make an ID
requirement "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" would shed no light on
what is necessary, for example, to make regulations of third-party voter
registration drives constitutionally permissible,1 22 or on what safeguards
must be implemented if a state undertakes to update its voter rolls by cross-
120. Cf. ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes, No. Civ. 05-1136, 2007 WL 782167, at *36-
37 (D.N.M. Feb. 12, 2007) (enjoining City of Albuquerque voter ID requirement found to vest
too much discretion in poll workers).
121. Foley, supra note 47, at 79.
122. Cf. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Cox, No. 06-1891, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 28, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction) (invalidating a regulation that
required persons registering to vote to seal their completed application prior to submitting it to
any person other than the state registrar or deputy registrar, and that prohibited the copying of
completed voter registration applications); Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) (entering a preliminary injunction against a law that established registration and
training requirements, backed by criminal penalties, for paid participants in voter registration
drives); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (issuing
a preliminary injunction against a law that fined voter registration organizations for late
submissions).
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referencing other databases. 23  The Supreme Court's decision would
suggest, however, that judges may properly resolve such cases by making
free-form pronouncements about what further statutory provisions must be
added to one or another regulation of the voting process. Whether or not
Foley is right that "unanimous Platonic Guardianship" of this sort from a
nine-member, ideological diverse Supreme Court would be healthy for our
democracy, 124 most of the guardianship in practice would take place via
trial judges acting individually, or three-judge appellate panels composed
without regard for ideological balance and using simple-majority voting
rules. At a time of renewed and highly partisan legislative attention to the
nuts and bolts of the voting process, this is not a happy prospect for anyone
worried about judicial partisanship or its appearance in the resolution of
conflicts over the ground rules of electoral competition.
The mandate/prohibition strategy might not be quite so risky if it were
developed in a procedurally oriented fashion, however. Rather than
undertaking to prescribe exemptions that a class of controversial voting
requirements must feature to qualify as permissible, the Supreme Court
might try to establish procedural norms for electoral reform in the face of
partisan dissensus. For example, the Court might presume a voting
requirement unreasonable if (1) it was enacted substantially along partisan
lines, and (2) its burden has been shown to fall disproportionately upon
voters affiliated with the dissenting party, unless (3) the requirement
includes appropriate sunset and monitoring provisions (somehow defined).
From a manageability perspective, this procedural approach has the
advantage of a broad domain (it would extend to all partisan voting
reforms); the potential for bright-line cutoffs (a sunset provision might be
deemed reasonable if shorter than x years; a vote of the legislature would
be deemed substantially partisan if no more than y percent of the opposition
party members voted for the bill); and minimal intrusiveness (the
legislature could maintain its substantive vision for the electoral process by
periodically reenacting the contested requirements).
The development of such procedural rules for lawmaking in the teeth
of partisan disagreement might be justified as a means of protecting public
confidence in the fairness of the political process, 125 or as a strategic
123. Cf Florida State Conference of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, No. 4:07-cv-00402 (N.D.
Fla. Dec. 18, 2007) (order granting motion for a preliminary injunction).
124. Foley, supra note 47, at 79.
125. Cf Purcell v. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. 5, 7 (2006) ("Confidence in the integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy."); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1968) (positing that the right to vote on equal
terms with others is fundamental because "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who
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measure to foster the production of data that will make clear whether the
challenged requirement have unconstitutional effects.126 These predicates
for judicial intervention are no doubt controversial, however, as is the very
idea that the courts may use constitutional holdings to establish procedural
requirements for certain classes of legislation. Moreover, a procedural
mandate would only buy the courts time. The fundamental right to vote
has substantive bite, and eventually the Supreme Court will have to explain
how this right constrains state efforts to regulate the process by which
members of the normative electorate are invited to record their political
preferences.
IV. Applying Burdick: The Right to Vote as a Right in Service of
Democratic Self-Government
The best hope for applying Burdick to the new generation of voting
claims without undermining the judiciary's reputation for impartiality is, I
think, to focus the "burden" inquiry on how voting requirements affect
electoral participation by the normative electorate as a whole. Instead of
asking whether the requirements at issue make voting excessively difficult
for the plaintiff-voters (the individual rights approach); or about the reasons
for their enactment, the reasonableness of their tailoring, or the presence or
absence of key provisions (the agnostic approaches); the courts would ask
whether the requirements cause the number or distribution of participating
voters to deteriorate by more than a given amount (x%). If so, the
requirements would be deemed presumptively impermissible, and would
face strict scrutiny. If not, the requirements would be deemed
presumptively permissible, and reviewed very leniently.
To implement this strategy, the courts would have to answer a number
of further questions. Perhaps the most important is whether to privilege
voter participation as such, or rather the representativeness of the voting
public (vis-A-vis the normative electorate as a whole). On the former
approach, a requirement is constitutionally suspect to the extent that it
reduces the total number of eligible citizens who participate. On the latter
approach, departures from universal participation are unimportant except
insofar as those voters who do participate comprise a politically skewed
subsample of the normative electorate, in the sense that the distribution of
may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government.").
126. Such data would be relevant on a structural understanding of the right to vote. See infra
Part IV.
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interests and concerns among the voting public is unlike the corresponding
distribution within the normative electorate as a whole.
A second critical choice is the regulatory benchmark to use in
deciding what effects may be properly attributed to the challenged
requirements for level-of-scrutiny purposes. Elections are and must be
thoroughly regulated, so it makes little sense to presume a libertarian, no-
regulation benchmark for this purpose. The level or distribution of voter
participation under the challenged requirements might instead be compared
with that which would have obtained under the previous state law, or under
the typical alternative to the challenged requirements found in other states,
or under the least skewing or least dampening alternative found elsewhere.
Third, the courts will have to settle upon measures of voter
participation or skew, and to choose quantitative cutoffs separating
"severe" from "lesser" effects. 127 Judges will also have to decide whether
and if so how to allow plaintiffs to aggregate voting requirements-
challenging several at once-in the hopes of establishing a cumulative
effect sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny of a set of requirements, each of
which would be deemed innocuous if considered on its own. 128  (Some
allowance for aggregation seems advisable, so as not to leave legislatures
and administrative agencies with free rein to erect exclusionary barriers in a
piecemeal fashion.) Finally, the courts will need a rhetoric that makes their
choices on all these fronts intelligible and attractive to the citizenry at large.
It should be apparent that the adoption of any such effects-oriented
rendition of Burdick would put great strain on the "individual rights" and
"no theory" precepts that have long informed the Supreme Court's
constitutional voting rights jurisprudence. On traditional understandings,
an individual right is an entitlement that the rights-holder may exercise or
not as she wishes. Thus, the fact that a right has not been exercised need
not be probative of the existence of potentially unconstitutional burdens on
127. To be sure, it is not strictly necessary that the courts establish a formal cutoff and
employ a two-tiered standard of review-but manageability considerations strongly militate in
favor of this strategy. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion)
("Having failed to make the case for strict scrutiny of political gerrymandering, Justice
STEVENS falls back on the argument that scrutiny levels simply do not matter for purposes of
justiciability. He asserts that a standard imposing a strong presumption of invalidity (strict
scrutiny) is no more discernible and manageable than a standard requiring an evenhanded
balancing of all considerations with no thumb on the scales (ordinary scrutiny). To state this is to
refute it. As is well known, strict scrutiny readily, and almost always, results in invalidation.").
128. Cf Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 607-08 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A
panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered alone, may nevertheless have
the combined effect of severely restricting [electoral] participation and competition. Even if each
part of a regulatory regime might be upheld if challenged separately, one or another of these parts
might have to fall if the overall scheme unreasonably curtails associational freedoms.").
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the right. The approach I suggest here inverts traditional rights-based
thinking: What matters is not the form or size of the barrier faced by
particular rights-bearers, or the state purpose behind the barrier, but
whether the barrier is surmounted, and the right exercised, by a large or
representative share of the citizenry. The constitutional good associated
with voting is realized-or not realized-at an aggregate level.
An aggregate-effects gloss on Burdick would also undermine the "no
theory" maxim. Without a theory, how are the courts to choose, for
example, between the maximal-participation and representative-
participation norms? The aggregate rate of voter participation might be
thought an object of constitutional concern insofar as it signifies the
legitimacy of the political order. The representativeness of the voting
public might be valued on the theory that a representative voting public
best approximates the electoral ideal in which public officials are chosen by
and accountable to the normative electorate as a whole. Perhaps there are
other reasons to prefer one of these approaches over the other. But once
one commits to an aggregate-consequences framework, a choice must be
made-and defended-about which consequences to privilege. The
question of what goods are served by the exercise of the franchise can
longer be papered over. The very explicitness of consequential approaches
to the Burdick test-the need to make overt choices about measures of
impact, regulatory benchmarks, severity cutoffs, and the like-would
create pressure for the development of a political theory about voting and
its regulation under the Constitution.
The balance of this Part explains why an aggregate-consequences
approach should prove less threatening to the judiciary's reputation for
impartiality than the individual-right/practical-barrier or the agnostic
glosses on Burdick outlined above. By way of preview: the consequential
alternatives rely upon an objective, empirically discernable phenomenon as
the predicate for judicial intervention, rather than the individual judge's
sense of political justice; they provide opportunities for compromise
between values cherished by liberals and those cherished by conservatives;
they can be designed to curtail judicial intervention under contemporary
circumstances substantially, yet without sacrificing the prospect of a
judicial remedy in the event that a state establishes new voting rules with
severe consequences; they should tend to delay judicial intervention until
some time after the enactment of polarizing legislation; and they are readily
explained to the general public.
A. Objectivity
The individual-right/practical-barrier and agnostic approaches
surveyed above require judges to make essentially personal and
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unquantifiable judgments about matters such as the extent of relative
burden among voters that a democracy ought to tolerate, the voter's civic
responsibility to deal with certain barriers, the reasonableness of a voting
requirement's design vis-A-vis the ends it is supposed to accomplish, or the
reasonableness of particular legislative efforts to comply with the
judiciary's mandatory-terms requirements (e.g., hardship exemptions to
voter ID).
An aggregate-consequences approach along the lines sketched here
would not entail such judgments. Lower courts would undertake to
measure the effects of challenged laws, not their fairness or justice. If the
effects reach a certain magnitude, the challenged laws will face
presumptively fatal strict scrutiny laws; if the effects do not rise to that
level, the laws will almost surely be upheld.
To be sure, the development and application of this framework would
present many occasions for the exercise of judicial discretion. Appellate
courts would have to settle upon measures of skew and cutoffs for
separating severe from lesser skewing effects. Trial judges would have to
weigh the testimony of competing expert witnesses. Trial judges might
also need to sort and classify the regulatory strategies of other states for the
purpose of defining regulatory benchmarks and presumptive remedies.
All this leaves much more to the discretion of individual judges than,
for example, determining whether an advance registration requirement is
longer or shorter than fifty days, 129 or whether deviations from perfect
population equality under a redistricting plan exceed ten percent. 3 ' But
there would be important constraints. Judges would lack authority to
intervene absent quantitative evidence concerning the challenged
requirements' impact. Honest judges would have little choice but to abide
any consensus that emerges among social scientists regarding the effects of
particular laws or the best methodology for measuring such effects. And in
cases where the evidence admits of competing interpretations, it would at
least be clear what judges ought to be doing-and that that would not
consist of giving effect to the judge's own assessment of the challenged
law's reasonableness, fairness, or justice.
B. Compromise
An aggregate-consequences framework would be comparatively
conducive to enduring compromise between liberal and conservative
129. Cf Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973) (remarking that fifty days "approaches
the outer constitutional limits" of permissible advance-registration requirements for voting).
130. Cf Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983) (indicating that deviations of less
than 10% are presumptively permissible).
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jurists. This follows from the framework's broad domain of application
(once fleshed out, the framework could be used to adjudicate most any
claim that a state has hindered qualified electors' participation by
structuring the voting process in unacceptable ways) and the range of
choices that must be made in elaborating the framework.
To illustrate, one can imagine a relatively conservative Justice going
along with the "skewing effects" gloss on what consequences matter, if in
return the liberal Justices accept the "typical state practice" regulatory
benchmark (rather than a "previous state law" or "least skewing
alternative" benchmark) and a high threshold as the trigger for strict
scrutiny. Liberals would obtain ratification of the principle that elected
officials ought to answer to all adult resident citizens in the jurisdiction,
rather than a privileged subset thereof. Conservatives would gain the
liberals' commitment not to displace ordinary state practices, and to refrain
from intervening absent really serious departures from the representative-
participation ideal. There would be further opportunities for compromise
on the question of how skewing effects will be measured (i.e., what
dimensions of political identity will be privileged); and on the
constitutional standard that will be applied to individualistic/dignitary
voting claims (will it reach anything but de jure exclusion from the
normative electorate?).
If, in the interest of protecting the judiciary's reputation for
impartiality, a compromise along these lines can be reached, that should
facilitate good-faith application of the doctrinal standard by liberals and
conservatives alike in the lower courts. Subterfuge seems less likely if the
governing doctrinal standard does not emerge in a polarizing 5-4 opinion
from an ideologically divided Supreme Court.
It is true, of course, that liberal-conservative compromises may also be
reached on particular facts under the individual-right/practical-barrier
model of adjudication, or as to particular requirements under the agnostic
approaches. But an enduring compromise should be easier to attain under
the structural approach. The structural approach depersonalizes
adjudication. In recognition of the perils of seemingly partisan judicial
pronouncements on the reasonableness of particular voting requirements
(or applications of those requirements), the structural approach requires
judges to set an abstract standard for what effects will be tolerated. Once
set, this standard will yield an answer in most any subsequent voter
participation case. The judge presiding over that case need not and should
not say whether the challenged requirement or application is sensibly
tailored or benignly intended or appropriately leavened with
accommodations for burdened voters. This is important. A judge who
writes or signs onto a compromise opinion concerning the latter questions
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inevitably compromises her integrity to some degree. She must say
something about the challenged requirement that she does not believe. A
pattern of compromise in such circumstances seems unlikely. Compromise
should be easier to come by if the doctrinal standard is unequivocally
objective, such that its application implies nothing at all about the judge's
own views concerning the fairness or reasonableness of the requirements at
issue.
C. Disruptiveness
One might fear that an aggregate-consequences approach would prove
disruptive of longstanding election administration practices, particularly if
the courts were to privilege the representative-participation norm (and even
if ordinary state practices were used to define the regulatory benchmark
and presumptive remedy). The more disruption there is, the more the
courts will be under attack and in the news. Judicial partisanship or its
appearance would be that much harder to obscure from the general public's
view. 131
The fear of disruption is plausibly rooted in two observations. The
first concerns the demographics of political participation: elderly, highly
educated, and affluent citizens are overrepresented among the voting
public, whereas poor people, poorly educated people, young people, and
members of certain minority groups vote in disproportionately low
numbers relative to their share of the normative electorate. 32  Second,
because voting is a "low-benefit, low-cost activity," "small changes in the
cost of voting might have sizable effects on overall turnout rates and
influence the turnout of some groups more than others."' 33 Such changes
may result from any number of modest regulations whose true purpose is
fraud reduction or administrative convenience.
The fear of disruption is greatly exaggerated-and particularly so if
the courts were to privilege representative participation over sheer extent of
participation. Political scientists who have studied the distribution of
political views among the voting and non-voting publics have generally
concluded that the voting public is, in fact, fairly representative of
131. Cf Veith v. Jubelirer, 547 U.S. 267, 292-93 (2004) (plurality opinion) (where Justice
Scalia suggested that a vague standard could be deemed manageable for relatively rare racial
gerrymandering claims, but would not suffice for regulating the much more pervasive practice of
partisan gerrymandering).
132. For a review of the literature, see Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy's
Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1 (1997).
133. Benjamin Highton, Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States, 2 PERSP. POL.
507, 508 (2004).
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nonvoters. 134  To be sure, there are some research findings to the
contrary, 135 but much of the empirical work stands as an antidote to what
political scientists Benjamin Highton and Raymond Wolfinger call "the
widespread belief 'that if everybody in this country voted, the Democrats
would be in for the next 100 years. '''136 Moreover, it's far from clear that
removing the remaining barriers to voter participation (such as registration
requirements, in-person voting requirements, etc.) would do much to
improve the representativeness of the voting public. Reviewing the
evidence to date, MIT professor Adam Berinksy argues that recent reforms
meant to lower the cost of voting "may have increased turnout slightly but
[have] not had the hypothesized partisan effects. 137  If anything, these
reforms have increased the socioeconomic bias of the electorate, boosting
the frequency with which the politically engaged participate in elections
but doing little to draw in the marginalized.1 38  For nonparticipants,
Berinsky hypothesizes, the predominant barrier to participating is not the
"direct cost[] of registration and getting to the ballot box," but rather the
"cognitive cost[] of becoming engaged with and informed about the
political world."
139
That this is generally so today does not mean it will be so tomorrow.
In times past, poll taxes and literacy tests proved remarkably effective as
134. Much of this literature is canvassed in Benjamin Highton & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The
Political Implications of Higher Turnout, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SC. 179, 180-86 (2001). See also Jack
Citran et al., What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate
Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 75 (2003).
135. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, Silent Voices: Social Welfare Policy Opinions and Political
Participation in America, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 276 (2002) (finding that nonvoters are more liberal
on social welfare policy questions); Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters:
The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics, 67 J. POL. 515 (2005) (agreeing that "fears
of a skewed electorate leading to biased outcomes are largely unfounded" vis-A-vis national
elections, but demonstrating that skew is much more pronounced in low-turnout local elections).
136. Highton & Wolfinger, supra note 134, at 179 (quoting John Kenneth Galbraith,
Interview, CAL. MONTHLY, Feb. 1986, at 11).
137. Berinsky, supra note 17, at472.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 472. See also Highton, supra note 133 (reviewing empirical literature and arguing
that "there are minimal partisan implications of contemporary registration laws and that
registration reform has probably reached its limits of enhancing turnout). This is not to say that
there are no electoral mechanics reforms that could increase the representativeness of the voting
public. Cf. Raymond E. Wolfmger et al., How Postregistration Laws Affect the Turnout of
Citizens Registered to Vote, 5 STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 1 (2005) (estimating that the
establishment of policies such as mailing voters a sample ballot and information about their
polling places, extending the hours that polls are open, and requiring employers to give workers
time off to vote, can increase turnout of registered voters by about three percentage points with a
disproportionate increase among the young and less well educated).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tools of disenfranchisement.140  It remains to be seen whether recently
enacted photo ID requirements and restrictions on voter registration drives
will significantly affect participation rates among disadvantaged groups.
But the recent empirical research should provide some comfort to anyone
who worries that judicial embrace of the proposed framework would
increase judicial intervention in the political process. Indeed, if paired with
a restrictive understanding of the personal right to vote, the
consequential/representative-participation approach should have precisely
the opposite effect.
141
D. The Timing of Judicial Intervention
Under the agnostic glosses on the Burdick test, voter participation
claims can be brought right after the enactment of the challenged
requirement. Under the individual-right/practical-barrier approach, claims
can be brought as soon as differentially burdened individuals are
identified. 142
Under the aggregate-consequences approaches, by contrast, judicial
review of new voting requirements would be delayed until social scientists
have developed a record of their effects. One may regret that this would
allow unconstitutional laws to take effect, but from a manageability
perspective, delay should be salutary. Delay gives the political branches a
chance to reverse or modify burdensome legislation before the courts step
in-a possibility that should not be discounted with respect to bills that
spark heated partisan conflict. Delay also means that when it comes time
for the courts to act, the courts will have more information about how the
challenged requirements have been received by the general public, and
about the dimensions, intensity, and persistence of associated partisan
conflict.
To be sure, there may be some requirements whose consequences the
courts could assess pre-implementation. For example, if State A adopts a
140. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
141. A sheer-numbers version of the consequential approach has the potential to be somewhat
more disruptive. For example, a state's failure to adopt same-day voter registration might well be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge, although the adoption of a "typical state practices"
regulatory benchmark could forestall this and related challenges until same-day registration has
been adopted in more than half of the states. (Regarding the impact of advance-registration
periods on turnout, see Stephen Ansolabehere & David M. Konisky, The Introduction of Voter
Registration and Its Effects on Turnout, 24 POL. ANALYSIS 83 (2006), and sources cited therein.).
142. During the Crawford oral argument, the Solicitor General acknowledged under
questioning from Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy that a pre-implementation as-applied challenge
could be brought against Indiana's ID requirement by any voter for whom obtaining ID would
pose a hardship. See Transcript, supra note 83, at 57-58.
[Vol. 35:4
measure identical in most respects to a measure recently judged
unconstitutional in State B, the evidentiary record developed in the
challenge to State B's law may provide enough information for a court to
draw "more likely than not" conclusions about the effects of State A's
requirements. Notice, though, that pre-implementation challenges will be
feasible mostly for old, familiar forms of voting regulation. If the courts
look to typical state practice in defining the regulatory benchmark, many of
these will enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. Truly novel
requirements will not be susceptible to pre-implementation challenge, and
on manageability grounds, at least, this should be welcomed rather than
regretted.
E. The Public Accessibility of the Standard
The aggregate-consequences approaches to voter participation claims
have the virtue of normative transparency. A court cannot deploy this
method of analysis without being clear about what consequences matter.
From a manageability perspective, however, normative transparency is a
mixed blessing. It may facilitate public explanation and defense of judicial
interventions. Then again, it may open judicial decisions to criticism on
the ground that the court privileged the wrong norms, or fundamentally
misunderstood the empirical evidence. Normative transparency has not
been a characteristic feature of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
political rights to date-recall the "no theory" precept-which perhaps
suggests that the Justices credit the risks of normative transparency more
than the benefits.
The advantages and disadvantages of transparency are not
independent of the mix of cases that reach the courts, however. Obscuring
the normative foundations of its decisions may sometimes help the
Supreme Court to dodge criticism, but at the price of leaving the lower
courts bereft of guidance when confronted with constitutional challenges to
new kinds of voting requirements. Thus, the more varied and numerous the
politically contentious election law cases that stand to reach the courts, and
the more that judges' intuitions about the correct decision in such cases
correlate with interests of their political parties, the greater the risk to the
judiciary's reputation for impartiality if the Supreme Court leaves the
normative bases of its holdings unspecified. 143 Agnosticism may not suit
the present age.
143. This assumes, of course, that the Supreme Court's specification of the normative
foundations of its decisions would be honored by lower courts when they face questions as to
which there is no Supreme Court holding directly on point.
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One could agree with everything I have said to this point and still
maintain that the aggregate-consequences approaches are beyond the
judicial ken for the simple reason that they require the courts to immerse
themselves in the fine points of social scientific research. This objection
has considerable force. As I have elsewhere explained at length, one of the
defining features of the Supreme Court's Storer-Burdick jurisprudence as a
whole is an apparent reluctance to ground burden characterization, and
hence scrutiny levels, on empirical evidence about how the requirements at
issue actually affect the political process.1 44 The Court sets scrutiny levels
mainly "on the basis of relatively simple, formal inquiries into (1) the type
of burden created, (2) proxies for impact. . . , and, somewhat more
equivocally, legislative purposes."' 145  The same inclination toward
formalism can be seen in other domains of the constitutional law of
democracy, including the malapportionment cases (consider the rigidity
with which the court enforces the one person, one vote requirement,
146
albeit only once every ten years 147); the campaign finance jurisprudence
(consider the contribution/expenditure distinction1 48); and the manner in
which the Court undertook to regulate poll taxes and other voter
qualifications (with ipse dixit declarations of what is and is not
permissible 149).
This preference for formalism in is entirely understandable. It keeps
the courts from getting mired in technically complicated questions about
measurement. It often yields bright line rules, whose prudential virtues are
obvious enough when the courts are asked to adjudicate the disputes of
warring political parties and their interest-group allies over the ground rules
of political competition. And it allows the Supreme Court to avoid
articulating a precise account of the constitutional harms that supposedly
144. See Elmendorf, supra note 1.
145. Id. at 376.
146. Cf Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (rejecting notion that there is any safe
harbor for one person, one vote claims at the national level).
147. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2006) (noting that
"States operate under the legal fiction that their plans are constitutionally apportioned throughout
the decade [between censuses], a presumption that is necessary to avoid constant redistricting,
with accompanying costs and instability.").
148. Under the Court's cases, limits on financial contributions to candidates receive strict
scrutiny, whereas limits on candidate expenditures are generally subject to deferential review.
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385-88 (2000) (discussing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and explaining that "[w]hile we did not then say in so many words that
different standards might govern expenditure and contribution limits affecting associational
rights, we have since then said so explicitly.").
149. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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warrant judicial intervention in the political process, which is convenient
given how little the Constitution says about the law of democracy, and
given the conventional understanding that courts should only enforce
personal constitutional rights.
But I do not think the Court's uneasiness about empirically oriented
standards forecloses an aggregate-consequences approach to voter
participation claims-if the regulatory benchmark is defined in terms of
ordinary state practices and if threshold for strict scrutiny is set high
enough. The Court's resistance to empirical glosses on the Burdick test has
been most strenuous when plaintiffs have argued that the state should be
required to come forward with evidence that problems it has targeted with
ordinary requirements are real and substantial. 150 That, said the Court,
"would invariably lead to endless court battles over the sufficiency of the
'evidence,"' and "would necessitate that a State's political system sustain
some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective
action."'151 An ordinary-state-practices benchmark would obviate this
problem. Note also that under the approach I have suggested, expert
testimony would only become relevant if there is a case to be made that the
challenged requirements have had a large impact on voter participation,
cresting the relevant threshold.
It also bears mention that the Supreme Court could commit itself
normatively to an aggregate-consequences approach and then use
presumptions to lessen the need for complicated empirical inquiries. 52 For
example, the Court might hold that in the absence of reliable empirical
evidence about skew, strict scrutiny will be triggered if reasonably
objective "danger signs" suggest that the challenged requirements are likely
to have substantial skewing effects. Along these lines, Professor Daniel
Tokaji and I have argued that strict scrutiny may well be appropriate in
Crawford because of "the Indiana photo ID requirement's extreme outlier
status relative to the practices of other States; the law's enactment by a
substantially party-line vote of the legislature; and its cumbersome
procedure for accommodating indigent voters.' 53 There is support in the
case law for the danger signs approach, though the Court has not yet
150. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1986).
151. Id.
152. Cf Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 345-48 (presenting an interpretation ofStorer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974), under which courts are to make presumption-guided empirical inquiries in
cases concerning the stringency of restrictions on independent candidates' and third parties'
access to the ballot).
153. Elmendorf& Tokaji Brief, supra note 102, at 5, 26-34.
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characterized its electoral mechanics jurisprudence in these terms. 154 But
whether the approach can be cashed out in a sufficiently mechanical way-
sufficient to obtain a tolerable degree of consistency in application across
liberal and conservative judges-remains to be seen.
The Court's apparent uneasiness about linking the constitutionality of
election laws to social scientific findings is, I think, the strongest
"manageability" count against an aggregate-consequences approach to
voter participation claims.155 Thus, whether the manifest problems with the
alternative approaches will prompt the Court to overcome this uneasiness
also remains to be seen.
V. Textual and Doctrinal Foundations for an Aggregate-
Consequences Approach
It may be objected that the putative manageability advantages of an
aggregate-consequences approach are of academic interest only, because
there is no foundation in the Constitution or in the Supreme Court's case
law for such an approach. I disagree. In my view, the most normatively
attractive version of the aggregate-consequences approach has a better
foundation in the Constitution and in Supreme Court case law than its
principal normative competitor, the individual-right/practical-barrier
model. The latter claim especially will no doubt seem a stretch to many,
given the nominal doctrinal status of the right to vote as an individual right.
But as I shall show, this nominal status does not tell the whole story, and,
more particularly, it does not support the proposition that a voting
regulation that makes it substantially more difficulty for the plaintiff-voter
than for others to participate has "severely" burdened anyone's rights
within the meaning of Burdick.
The consequential approach I wish to defend rests on the following
ideas. One, there is a constitutional injury associated with any voting
requirement that causes the political demographics of the voting public-
the subset of the citizenry that regularly participates in elections-to depart
from the demographic profile of the normative electorate. Second, the
mere fact of such a departure does not warrant judicial invalidation of the
offending voting requirements. The constitutional cost may be justified.
154. See id. at 27-30; Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 324, 335-80 (suggesting that much of the
Storer-Burdick jurisprudence may be understood in "danger signs" terms).
155. Cf Fallon, supra note 45, at 1291 (noting that "[a] test may be deemed judicially
unmanageable if would require courts to make empirical fmdings... for which they lack
competence," but observing that this consideration has usually been invoked only if the courts
also conclude that "another institution is both better situated and constitutionally obliged to make
the requisite assessments.").
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Third, the courts should presume that departures from representative
participation are justified if they result from ordinary voting requirements,
defined as those found in a majority or plurality of the states, unless the
plaintiff establishes that the ordinary requirements in question have
persisted only because of the self- or party-entrenching interests of elected
officials. 156  Fourth, to trigger strict scrutiny, plaintiffs would have to
establish that the challenged requirements cause a quantitatively "severe"
skew in voter participation, relative to the level of skew that would be
obtained if the challenged requirements were replaced with commonplace
alternatives found in other states.
A. Foundations in the Constitution Proper
The proposition that the Constitution privileges the representative-
participation norm is debatable, as is the notion that it calls for a substantial
measure of judicial deference to the states in matters of election
administration. But there are hooks in the Constitution's text for these
ideas, which is more than can be said for the individual-right/practical-
barrier alternative.
The Constitution speaks to voting in three ways. First, and most
obviously, it speaks through the prohibitory voting amendments-the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth-which disallow
discrimination with respect to voting on the basis of race, sex, payment of a
tax (for purposes of federal elections), and age (for citizens over eighteen).
Given their group-specific reach, these amendments cannot support a
generic right to vote, one that could be invoked by any citizen who seeks an
exemption from regulatory barriers to electoral participation.
Second, there is the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, which
specifies that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." 157  However the Guarantee
Clause is best read, it too seems an extremely improbable hook for the
individual-right/practical-barrier conception of voting rights. As the
Supreme Court has suggested when holding Guarantee Clause claims
nonjusticiable, the Clause seems to be concerned with the overall structure
156. The evidentiary standard for this showing should be demanding. For example, plaintiffs
might be required to prove that the requirement does not exist in most states that provide for
lawmaking by ballot initiative. Cf. Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating
Democracy Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S.
CAL. L. REv. 997 (2005) (examining whether election laws differ systematically as between
states that provide for lawmaking by ballot initiative and states that require all laws to be passed
by the legislature).
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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or functioning of state governments, rather than individuated rights. 58
(The Guarantee Clause might provide a home for the representative-
participation norm, but that question is largely academic given the Clause's
longstanding status as nonjusticiable.)
Third, the Constitution addresses voting in its prescription for the
selection of Members of Congress in the Elections Clause of Article I and
in the Seventeenth Amendment. Here the document may be read to furnish
both a normative ideal against which actual selection mechanisms may be
evaluated, and an allocation of regulatory authority with respect to the
selection process. The normative ideal is this: congressional
representatives are to be "chosen by the people" of their respective
states. 159 Not by the people's state legislators, not by a monied or landed
aristocracy, but by the people as a whole. As for the allocation of
regulatory authority, Article I defines the normative electorate for
congressional elections derivatively; each state's congressional delegation
is to be selected by those persons who are qualified to vote for the most
numerous house of the state's legislature. 160  As a result, the states have
exclusive authority to establish who may vote in federal elections. Article I
also empowers the states to regulate the time, place, and manner of
congressional elections.161  These state regulations are subject to
congressional override, unlike state rules concerning the qualifications of
electors.
Do Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment provide a plausible
basis for the individual-right/practical-barrier model? No. "Choice by the
people" implies preference aggregation across the multitudes who make up
the citizenry of each state. That a voting regulation erects high hurdles to
158. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) ("The basis for th[is] suit
[challenging the apportionment of population among legislative districts] is not a private wrong,
but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity."); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118, 149-51 (1912) (distinguishing legislative authority "as to purely political questions"
concerning the "framework and political character" of a state government, from judicial authority
over "justiciable controversies" involving rights specific to the defendant).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST amend. XVII.
160. Article I, section 2 provides, "The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature." The Seventeenth Amendment specifies, "The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .... The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures."
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall by prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.").
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electoral participation by one or another citizen tells us nothing about
whether that regulation substantially distorts the aggregation process.
"Choice by the people" may serve, however, as an implied limitation
upon the states' power to set voter qualifications and the states' and
Congress's authority to regulate the time, place, and manner of federal
elections. Consider a silly example. Imagine that a state enacts a
qualification such that in order to vote for the most numerous branch of its
legislature, one has to be a citizen of France. Assume that these electors
proceed to vote for the state's representatives in Congress, pursuant to the
second clause of the first sentence of Article I, Section 2. It could no
longer be said that the House of Representatives had been chosen "by the
People of the several States." The House would have been chosen by the
people of most of the states, plus the people of France.
Once one pushes beyond the silly examples, however, it is not obvious
how to give content to the idea of "choice by the people." Probably the
most commonsensical (and also the most historically grounded)
understanding is in terms of a perfectionist ideal that will never be realized:
an election in which (1) all members of the normative electorate cast valid,
properly counted ballots, (2) the normative electorate is defined broadly
enough to have a fair claim to speak on behalf of the people as a whole, and
(3) a simple majority vote determines the winners. 162 (Thanks to the
162. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749 (1994).
Amar argues that in the Founding, Antebellum, and Reconstruction Eras, the words "the People"
were understood to refer to citizens competent for self government-what I have termed the
"normative electorate." A republican government was one whose structure was "derived from
[these citizens]," and was "legally alterable by a [simple] 'majority' of them." Id. at 749. Bones
of contention arose not over this principle, but rather over the two associated "denominator
problems," one geographic (was a State or the Nation the relevant whole?), id. at 766-68, the
other demographic (who belongs in the normative electorate?), id. at 768-73. It doesn't follow, of
course, that the Guarantee Clause requires legislators to be selected through a simple majority
vote of the civically competent class of citizens. Yet given the settled understanding of what it
meant for a form of government to be chosen by the people, and hence republican, it would be
incongruous to read the constitutional text's requirement that Members of Congress be chosen by
the people as directing anything other than majoritarian choice by those citizens competent for
self-government.
That the Framers understood that "choice by the people" could be distorted and even defeated by
state regulations of the time, place, and manner of elections is also suggested, I think, by the
Convention and ratification debates concerning congressional enforcement power under Article I,
§ 4. For an illuminating treatment of those debates, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan
in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Harlan considered them to be evidence that Congress
was to have exclusive authority (not shared with the courts) under Article I to superintend state
election administration. Id. at 23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). That inference seems to me a stretch,
given how little agreement there was in 1789 regarding the judicial review as a mechanism for
enforcing any constitutional provision. What is more significant, I think, is that the Framers and
the ratifiers apparently believed that "choice by the people" was a substantive (if not well
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Warren Court, it is now well settled as a matter of precedent-if not text
and history-that the normative electorate in national and statewide
elections must include all adult, non-felon, citizen residents of the
jurisdiction. 163)
If this is right, how should courts assess the inevitable shortcomings
from the perfectionist ideal? One answer is, not at all. "Choice by the
people" could be treated as decorative language, without justiciable
content. Alternatively, one might say that a constitutional cost is incurred
whenever a state employs election administration rule X instead of Y, if the
rate of voter participation would increase under Y. But this position could
lead to some peculiar results. For example, assume a status quo in which
one out of every four voting-qualified citizens elects to participate.
Citizens who participate are demographically and politically representative
of the citizens who do not. Several Democratic-controlled state legislatures
then pass laws directing that a $100 "voting bonus" be paid to each citizen
who lacks a high school degree or who falls into the bottom quartile of the
population by family income, and who agrees to vote in the next five
elections. This results in a massive increase in participation by low-income
and poorly educated voters, who overwhelmingly favor Democrats. The
Democrats' formerly tenuous hold on Congress becomes very secure, and
the ideological center of the legislature shifts sharply to the left. Turnout
has increased but are we closer or farther from the normative ideal of a
legislative body "chosen by the people" as a whole? I would say farther.
For purposes of maintaining the lines of accountability contemplated by
Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment, it is more important that voter
participation be representative than that it be rampant.' 64
specified) ideal that the states could, if left to their own devices, undermine with misdirected
regulations of the time, place, and manner of elections.
There is not much case law on the import of "choice by the people" within the meaning of Article
t, Section 2, but, notably, the Supreme Court has held that it protects a qualified voter's right to
have her ballot counted (even as against non-state actors, and even in the context of a primary
election), United States v. Classic, 313 US. 299 (1941); that it commands the rule of "one person,
one vote" for purposes of legislative apportionment, Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; and that it offers
some protection against vote dilution through the stuffing of ballot boxes, id. at 17 (citing United
States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944)).
163. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
164. To be sure, one can conceive of doctrinal standards that would allow courts to vindicate
max-participation claims without exacerbating problems of skew. For example, a court might
hold that strict scrutiny will be triggered if plaintiffs demonstrate that there is a practicable
alternative to the challenged requirements that would increase participation by x% without
exacerbating skew. I do not see any particular problems with inviting claims of this sort-other
than the perennial risks that attend to judicial involvement in political questions-but neither do I
see much benefit. If the challenged laws operate to dampen political participation rates but do not
[Vol. 35:4
Now, even if I'm right that the constitutional aspiration of "choice by
the people" is more fully realized under conditions of representative rather
than skewed voter participation, it hardly follows that representative
participation is the only permissible goal for states to pursue in regulating
the time, place, and manner of elections. Surely it is also legitimate for the
states to enact laws designed to make voting more convenient or secure, or
better informed, or less costly to administer, even if such laws have some
incidental adverse effect on turnout numbers or the representativeness of
the voting public. As the Court has long recognized, the Constitution's
delegation of election administration authority to the states implies that the
states have some discretion to make judgments about how best to organize
elections. 165
The Constitution is perhaps best understood as requiring legislators
and election administrators to make a good faith effort to honor the "choice
by the people" norm while reasonably pursuing other permissible goals.
But this is not a standard the courts can administer. The courts need a
template with sharper edges, especially when dealing with politically
fraught questions about voting requirements, and especially when
extending a norm that, if not properly limited, might be thought to require
forms of electoral regulation, such as compulsory voting, that are utterly
foreign to the American experience. 
166
Hence the second component of my proposed test: a strong
presumption of permissibility for ordinary voting requirements. This
presumption yields a portion of the needed template-a regulatory
benchmark. 167  If the challenged requirements perform as well as the
regulatory benchmark (vis-A-vis the representative-participation norm),
skew participation, elected officials can probably be counted on to reform the requirements that
have outlived their usefulness.
165. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974) (suggesting that Constitution's
delegation to the states of authority to set voter qualifications and regulate the time, place, and
manner of congressional elections rules out any judicial doctrine that would "automatically
invalidate[] every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate").
166. Compare the apportionment of population among legislative districts, which the Court
undertook to regulate by pronouncing a good faith requirement, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 577 (1964) ("the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith
effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable"), and then proceeded to implement with fairly hard-edged rules about permissible
population deviations, cf Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983) (stating that
deviations of less than 10 percent are presumptively permissible).
167. The other essential component of the template is a quantitative cutoff to separate
"severe" from "lesser" skewing effects (where, of course, the effects fairly attributable to the
challenged requirement are understood to consist of the difference between the degree of skew
under the status quo with the degree of skew that would obtain were the challenged requirements
replaced with the benchmark regulatory alternatives).
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they too shall be deemed beyond judicial reproach. The presumption of
permissibility for ordinary voting requirements may be justified in either of
two ways. It may be treated, first, as an implied correlate of the States'
constitutionally conferred responsibility for regulating the time, place, and
manner of elections. Compare Storer v. Brown,' 68 where the Supreme
Court remarked that the Constitution's delegation to the states of authority
to set voter qualifications and regulate the time, place, and manner of
congressional elections rules out any judicial doctrine that would
"automatically invalidate every substantial restriction on the right to vote or
to associate."1 69 Alternatively, the presumption may be conceptualized as a
response to judges' epistemic limitations. If the typical state legislator
takes seriously his or her sworn obligation to uphold the Constitution,
judicial reliance on the presumption may well result in more correct
decisions over the run of cases than if individual judges undertook to
assess, case by case, whether common voting requirements and their
functional equivalents actually emerged from "a good faith effort to honor
the representative participation norm while reasonably pursuing other
goals." The concurrent wisdom of the several states is likely sounder than
the perceptions of a single federal judge (or a panel of three or nine).
B. Doctrine
A critic of my proposed approach might respond to the textual
argument by saying that it's all beside the point. There is too much water
under the bridge. The right to vote on equal terms with others is well
established as an individual right, whereas "choice by the people" within
the meaning of Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment has never been
recognized as the source of a justiciable representative-participation norm.
This argument greatly overstates the extent to which the character of the
right to vote is doctrinally settled.
1. The Surprisingly Thin Basis in Precedent for the Individual-
Right/Practical-Barrier Model
The Supreme Court has indicated that the right to vote is a individual
right in two lines of decisions, one establishing the "one person, one vote"
standard for reapportionment, 170 the other applying strict scrutiny to state
laws that excluded a class of adult, non-felon, citizen residents from the
168. Storer, 415 U.S. 724.
169. Id. at 729-30. See also Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) (stating that
"ordinary and widespread" restrictions on political participation should not be deemed "severe"
for level-of-scrutiny purposes).
170. E.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533.
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normative electorate.' 71 But neither of these lines of precedent requires the
individual-right/practical-barrier gloss on Burdick as to voting requirements
that the state defends not as appropriate restrictions on who should exercise
the franchise, but as tools for keeping elections orderly, convenient, and
secure. There are precious few Supreme Court decisions involving such
requirements. The decisions in question, all from the early 1970s, offer
rhetorical support for the individual-right/practical-barrier model, but upon
closer inspection one discovers a Court back-pedaling away from this
model.
In Dunn v. Blumstein,172 a 1972 decision, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a one-year durational residency requirement, reasoning that it
operated as an absolute bar to the plaintiffs participation in the upcoming
election.173 This is entirely consistent with the individual-rights/practical-
barrier model. 174  The Court conceded that Tennessee had a compelling
interest in preventing fraudulent voting by nonresidents.' 75 But this did not
save the challenged requirement, given that the states were already making
do with a congressionally mandated thirty-day cap on residency
requirements for presidential elections. 76 If thirty days was long enough
for presidential elections, no longer durational residency requirement could
be presumed necessary for other elections.
Just one year after Dunn, however, the Court upheld a pair of fifty-day
advance registration requirements in Marston v. Lewis177 and Burns v.
Fortson.178 The Court did so via brief, per curiam opinions, without any
discussion of scrutiny levels, and over the fierce objection of dissenting
Justices who attacked the Court for disregarding basic tenets of strict
scrutiny.1 79 The dissenters were right: if the Court had been applying strict
171. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 336 ("Durational residence requirements completely bar from voting all
residents not meeting the fixed durational standards.").
174. It is consistent because a law that absolutely bars some citizens from voting while
allowing others to participate obviously erects a very "severe" impediment to participation for the
former group of citizens, relative to the costs of participation for the latter.
175. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345.
176. Id. at 345-49, n.19.
177. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
178. Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
179. Id.; Lewis, 410 U.S. 679. Also telling is O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974), a
contemporaneous decision in which the plurality applied arbitrariness review in holding that a
state may not provide absentee ballots to persons incarcerated within their county of residence
while denying such ballots to persons incarcerated elsewhere. Three concurring justices (the
dissenters in Marston and Burns) would have reached the same result by applying strict scrutiny.
Id.
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scrutiny, it would have struck down the fifty-day requirements as longer
than necessary.' Evidently the Court thought that something more than a
severe burden on one citizen in one election was necessary to trigger strict
scrutiny, contra the individual-right/practical-barrier model.
Marston and Burns were shortly followed by a pair of cases
concerning advance enrollment requirements for voting in partisan
primaries. Rosario v. Rockefeller applied lax scrutiny and sustained an
eleven month requirement;1 81 Kusper v. Pontikes struck down a twenty-
three month requirement, applying much more stringent review.1
82
Distinguishing Rosario, the Kusper Court observed: "Unlike the
petitioners in Rosario, whose disenfranchisement was caused by their own
failure to take timely measures to enroll, there was no action that Mrs.
Pontikes could have taken to make herself eligible to vote in the 1972
Democratic primary."'' 83  (Mrs. Pontikes had voted in the Republican
primary during the previous election cycle, and the advance enrollment
period exceeded the interval of time between election cycles.) This much
is consistent with the individual-right/practical-barrier model, which
disregards burdens that fall upon the civically negligent. But despite the
Court's attention to whether the named plaintiffs could fairly be faulted for
their disenfranchisement, Rosario and Kusper are not easy to square with
the individual rights model.
The problem is this: in Kusper and subsequent cases, the Court has
treated moderate advance enrollment requirements (like that in Rosario) as
beyond constitutional reproach.184 Yet as I have elsewhere observed:
180. For a thoughtful treatment of the departure from strict scrutiny analysis in Marston and
Burns, see Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by
Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996).
181. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
182. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
183. Id. at 60.
184. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) (citing the advance enrollment
requirement upheld in Rosario as a paradigmatic example of the sort of "ordinary and
widespread" barrier to political participation that must not be deemed severe); Democratic Party
of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 135-36 (1981) (suggesting that the
different outcomes in Rosario and Kusper reflected the fact that the long advance period in
Kusper simply "went too far in interfering with the freedom of the individual voter," unlike the
more moderate advance period in Rosario); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 731-32 (1974)
(suggesting that the import of Rosario and Kusper is that courts must draw careful, measured
lines between permissible voting requirements and those that go too far); Kusper, 414 U.S. at 59
("It is true, of course, that the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the New York delayed-
enrollment statute under review in Rosario.").
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Every advance enrollment requirement has the effect of absolutely
precluding from participation in the upcoming primary those new,
bona fide party adherents whose change-of-partisan-heart occurred
after the enrollment deadline. A failure to enroll in advance of the
deadline is only voluntary for those citizens who knew, prior to the
deadline, that they would want to vote in the party primary at
issue.
185
From an individualistic perspective, then, every advance enrollment
requirement creates a severe burden on some citizen. Yet the Court has
never so much as hinted that it would apply strict scrutiny to a modest
advance enrollment requirement if only the plaintiff could show that his
partisan identity changed after the enrollment deadline. Seen in this light,
Rosario and Kusper's rhetoric of voter fault merely provided a convenient
means of rationalizing decisions whose true basis must lie elsewhere.'
86
After Kusper came Storer, where the Court held that "reasonably
diligent" independent candidates have a constitutionally protected interest
in appearing on the ballot-as independents, not as "party men."'187 The
extension of the Constitution's shield only to those candidates who are
reasonably diligent is congruent, at least, with an individualistic approach
to assessing burdens on voter participation. (The individual has a right to
participate in the political process as voter or as candidate, but in order to
exercise this right, she must live up to certain civic responsibilities. The
unreasonable, dithering voter or candidate may be said to forfeit his right of
participation.)
Having recognized the reasonably diligent independent candidate's
constitutionally protected interest in ballot access, however, the Storer
Court set a constitutional standard for judging ballot access laws quite at
odds with an individualistic understanding of constitutional rights. The
185. Elmendorf supra note 1, at 354-55.
186. See id. at 353-57 (suggesting that Kusper and Rosario are best understood as a judicial
effort to strike and enforce a balance between two competing structural values: keeping the
candidate selection process responsive to new participants and ideas, and guarding the selection
process against opportunistic "raiding" by voters who do not intend to support the nominee at the
general election).
187. Storer, 415 U.S. at 728 (noting that the state must "provide feasible means for other
political parties and other candidates [not just the two major parties] to appear on the general
election ballot"), 742 (asking, as part of the constitutional inquiry, "[Clould a reasonably diligent
independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements ... ?") (emphasis added),
745-46 (rejecting State's argument that the existence of a fair opportunity to qualify for the ballot
as the candidate of a third party obviates the constitutional problem that would otherwise result
from a barrier to ballot access for independent candidates-because by availing himself of the
third-party route to ballot access "the candidate, who is by definition an independent and desires
to remain one, must now consider himself a party man, surrendering his independent status.").
Summer 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Court established what amounts to an aggregate-performance standard for
ballot access regimes, under which reasonably diligent independent
candidates must be able to qualify "more than rarely."' 188 Applying this
standard, a court's job is to assess how the challenged regime functions
over the run of candidates and elections.' 89 If the regime passes this test, it
would be gross abuse of discretion for a court to grant as-applied relief to a
reasonably diligent candidate for whom the ballot access rules, in
conjunction with her personal circumstances, put qualifying for the ballot
out of reach. That would amount to entering a constitutional remedy in the
absence of a constitutional wrong.
Beyond the framework it establishes for adjudicating the ballot-access
claims of independent candidates, Storer's underlying suppositions about
constitutional judicial review of electoral mechanics are hard to square with
the individual-right/practical-barrier model. The Storer Court said judicial
review would entail separating "specific provisions ... that are valid from
those that are invidious," by "considering the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and
the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."' 90 The
unit of constitutional analysis was to be a statute or its provisions-keeping
in view the full sweep of benefits and costs-rather than a particular
application. Storer observed that the states had enacted "most substantial"
regulations of "the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general
elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and
qualification of candidates,"' 9' yet confidently announced that "[i]t is very
unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail
to pass muster under our cases."' 192 It seems likely, though, that most "most
substantial" regulation of the political process will end up making
participation difficult for someone, thus calling the Storer Court's basic
assumption of permissibility into doubt if a single voter or candidate is the
proper unit of analysis.
188. See Storer, 414 U.S. at 741-43; Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 346-48 (explicating the
Storer standard).
189. The Storer Court also established what I have termed "structural presumptions" to guide
this inquiry when the data are murky. See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 347-48.
190. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968) and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).
191. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
192. Id.
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2. Doctrinal Precursors for Skewing-Effects Claims
The nominal doctrinal status of the right to vote as individual and
personal in nature is further weakened by a sequence of opinions in which
the Court seems attentive to the role of the franchise as an instrument of
representation and accountability. Representational concerns were featured
in Reynolds v. Sims, where the Court posited that "in a society ostensibly
grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a
majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's
legislators"; 193 in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, where the
court pronounced that legitimate "[v]oter qualifications have no relation to
wealth"; 194 in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, where the
Court reiterated that the right to vote is fundamental because "preservative
of other basic civil and political rights"; 195 in Gordon v. Lance, where the
Court rebuffed a Reynolds-based challenge to a supermajority voting rule
for bond referendum elections, because "no independently identifiable
group or category [of voters] ... favors bonded indebtedness over other
forms of financing"; 196 in Bullock v. Carter'97 and Lubin v. Panish198 where
the Court struck down filing fees thought to disproportionately impede
candidates who would appeal to low-income voters; and in Anderson v.
Celebrezze, where the Court observed after reviewing these and other
cases: "[I]t is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that
limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose
members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or
economic status."'
' 99
Taken together, these cases support the hypothesis that a voter who
continues to participate notwithstanding a burden that causes many of her
natural political allies to drop out of the voting public suffers a
constitutional injury because her ability to cast an effective vote (or, put
differently, her ability to engage in collective action for political change 200)
193. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
194. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
195. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (quoting Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 562).
196. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971).
197. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
198. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
199. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) (emphasis added).
200. Cf. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 88-92 (NYU Press
2003) (positing that the Supreme Court should protect an "equality right" of citizens to engage in
collective action for political change).
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has been harmed by state action that dissuades her political fellow-travelers
from participating.2 1
The strongest decisional counterpoints to this hypothesis are the
Supreme Court's vote dilution cases following Mobile v. Bolden.20 2 These
cases have all concerned the design of legislative districts. The plaintiff,
though free to cast a ballot, alleges that the state has denied her adequate
representation by lodging her in a district where members of her group (a
cohesive racial bloc, or a political party) are an ineffective, outnumbered
political minority, notwithstanding that a different configuration of districts
would have enabled her to join forces with other members of her group and
elect responsive representatives.
The Mobile Court, over a strong dissent by Justice Marshall, firmly
held that vote dilution claims may not be founded upon the fundamental
rights prong of equal protection analysis.2 °3 The right to vote on equal
terms with others does not include a corresponding right to representation.
To win a constitutional vote dilution claim, then, plaintiffs must show
intentional discrimination on an illicit ground plus a substantial burden on
their group's "representational rights. 20 4  By contrast, the conventional
threshold for strict scrutiny in an equal protection/fundamental rights claim
is whether the right has been granted to some and denied to others.
205
A critic of my proposed approach (and a defender of the individual-
right/practical-barrier alternative) might point out that the constitutional
injury under a skewing-effects approach to voter participation claims-
damage to the plaintiffs ability to join with like-minded citizens and
engage in collective action through voting-is much the same as the injury
201. Note, then, that damage to the lines of accountability contemplated by Article I and the
Seventeenth Amendment need not be the sort of "generalized" injury that precludes standing. Cf
Lance v. Coffinan, 127 S. Ct. 1194 (2007) (holding that plaintiff-citizens of Colorado did not
have standing to challenge order of Colorado Supreme Court as contrary to the Elections Clause
of Article I, § 4). Citizens who belong to political groups whose turnout is differentially and
adversely affected by a voting requirement would suffer a distinct injury. Cf Heather K. Gerken,
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1665, 1724-27 (2001)
(presenting theories of standing for vote-dilution claims).
202. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
203. Id. at 76.
204. The term "representational rights" is from Justice Kennedy's opinion in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307-10 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Since Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986), every Justice who has recognized partisan vote dilution claims as justiciable has
understood proof of discriminatory intent to be a necessary element of the claim. See generally
id.; Vieth, 541 U.S. 267; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
205. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969)
(explaining that strict scrutiny must be applied to statutes that "distribut[e] the franchise" to some
citizens while "denying [it] to [other] citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age").
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in a vote dilution challenge to the design of legislative districts.2 °6 In each
case, the citizen and her political allies, though entitled to participate by
voting, suffers a representational injury thanks to the mechanics of the
electoral process. That the mechanics in one scenario are anti-fraud
safeguards and in the other govern the translation of votes into
representation is immaterial, my critic will say. The doctrinal home for a
"skewing effects" participation claim, insofar as one exists at all, should be
sought in partisan vote dilution precedents. And there are serious questions
about whether partisan vote dilution claims are even justiciable.
20 7
The critic's argument supposes that the doctrinal rules that apply to
any given voting rights claim depend-exclusively-upon the nature of the
voter interest at stake. The participation interest is protected with one
framework; the representational interest with another. But the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence of political rights is not organized in this way.
Although the Court has required a showing of discriminatory intent in
constitutional vote dilution challenges to the design of equally populous
legislative districts, it has protected voters' representational interests vis-A-
vis other types of election laws (and other types of challenges to the design
of legislative districts) with doctrines that do not require such a showing.
These doctrines include: (1) the equi-population mandate for the design of
legislative districts; 20 8 (2) strict scrutiny for laws that condition candidates'
access to the ballot upon payment of a fee; 20 9 and (3) the nominal balancing
test applied to other restrictions on independent candidates' or third parties'
access to the ballot.210 In developing each of these doctrines, the Court
undertook to safeguard the instrumental value of voting, not merely the
voter's "personal" interest in participating as such.
If the nature of the voter's interest does not determine the applicable
doctrinal test, what does? There is no simple answer. The Court's
variegated political rights doctrines seem to emerge from pragmatic,
domain- and claim-specific judgments about the risk of institutionally
206. Cf Gerken, supra note 201, at 1676-89 (explaining the conception of injury behind vote
dilution claims).
207. There are serious questions about whether partisan vote dilution (as opposed to racial
vote dilution) claims are even justiciable. In Vieth, 541 U.S. 267, four Justices treated partisan
vote dilution claims as political questions, and the fifth, Justice Kennedy, expressed extreme
reluctance to entertain such claims absent a clear-cut standard grounded in traditional practices.
The extent of Kennedy's reservations became apparent in League of United American Citizens,
126 S. Ct. 2594, where he rejected the plaintiffs proposed per-se rule against mid-decade
redistricting-a standard that was both clear-cut and grounded in tradition.
208. E.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
209. E.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
210. E.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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debilitating entanglement in partisan conflict; 211 the need for judicial
involvement; 212 the extent to which the values the court is asked to
vindicate are constitutionally discernable; 213 the feasibility of crafting
doctrines that are amenable to consistent application in the lower courts;
21 4
the risk of deterring or preventing useful legislative activity;215 and the
options for limiting the generative potential of particular interventions so as
not to cast doubt upon popular, time-honored practices.216
211. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) ("Is the regular insertion of the judiciary
into districting, with the delay and uncertainty that brings to the political process and the partisan
enmity it brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achieved-an accelerated (by some
unknown degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think not.") (emphasis added).
212. Id.; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggesting that partisan gerrymandering claims should be deemed nonjusticiable
because, inter alia, "there is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting
enterprise."). Contrast Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), where the Court upended an
entrenched, half-century-old pattern of malapportionment in the Alabama legislature, remarking
that "since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.") (emphasis added).
213. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287-88 ("[A]ppellants' test would invalidate the districting only
when it prevents a majority of the electorate from electing a majority of representatives. Before
considering whether this particular standard is judicially manageable we question whether it is
judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some constitutional violation. Deny it as
appellants may (and do), this standard rests upon the principle that groups (or at least political-
action groups) have a right to proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no such
principle.").
214. This probably accounts for the penchant for formalism that runs through the Storer-
Burdick jurisprudence, see Elmendorf, supra note 1; and also the Vieth plurality's extreme
aversion to open-textured standards for judging partisan gerrymandering claims, see Fallon, supra
note 45, at 1287-90. See also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 799
(2008) ("None of our cases establishes an individual's constitutional right to have a 'fair shot' at
winning the party's nomination. And with good reason. What constitutes a 'fair shot' is a
reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which we will accept so long as it does not
too much infringe upon the party's associational rights. But it is hardly a manageable
constitutional question for judges .. "). Regarding the implications of this passage from Lopez
Torres for the development of doctrinal standards in future electoral mechanics cases, see Chris
Elmendorf, On Lopez Torres and Line Drawing, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Jan. 22, 2008,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=239.
215. This is a recurrent theme in the Storer-Burdick jurisprudence. See, e.g., Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to
require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as
petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated
equitably and efficiently."). Cf. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 908-19 (1994) (arguing that
the Court properly applies a relaxed balancing test in election law cases where the purpose of the
challenged regulation is to facilitate the voting process).
216. This concern is probably at the root of the Court's unwillingness to develop doctrines
that would enable third parties to challenge state laws that damage the party's electoral
prospects-for such a doctrine could cast doubt upon single-member district, first-past-the-post,
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This is why strict scrutiny can be reflexively applied in constitutional
challenges to de jure voter qualifications (laws that restrict the class of
citizens to whom elected officials are supposed to be accountable) no
matter how few in number the excluded citizens, but not in cases about
laws whose nominal purpose is to minimize the risk of fraud or error, or to
keep the cost of election administration within reason. Once the Warren
Court concluded that there was no important state interest in limiting the
normative electorate on grounds other than age, citizenship, and residence,
the Court could apply "fatal in fact" strict scrutiny to any other de jure
contraction of the normative electorate without worrying about undesirable
side effects. By contrast, there are manifestly important state interests in
limiting the number of candidates who appear on the ballot, and in
preventing electoral fraud. Hence the Storer/Burdick framework, which in
explicit recognition of the powerful state interests supporting much
regulation of mechanics of the electoral process, 2 17 reserves strict scrutiny
for the narrow subset of electoral mechanics cases in which the challenged
restriction is so "severe" as to be presumptively unconstitutional. This is
why Storer/Burdick, not Kramer/Dunn, furnishes the proper doctrinal
framework for the new voter participation cases, and why scrutiny levels
under Burdick must be set with reference to the aggregate effects of the
challenged requirement, rather than the plight of an individual voter or
candidate.
Conclusion
Judges and law professors alike have worried that an avowedly
structural approach to constitutional adjudication of political rights would
embroil the courts in contested questions that are beyond their competence
to resolve.21 8 This essay calls that premise into question. I have tried to
show that the Supreme Court's severe/lesser burden framework for
elections. In this regard, it is instructive to compare the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), with the Eighth Circuit's decision
in the same case. In striking down Minnesota's ban on fusion candidacies, the Court of Appeals
relied on evidence that minor parties had enjoyed a measure of success when fusion candidacies
were allowed. See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-99 (8th Cir.
1996). In the Supreme Court, however, neither the majority nor the dissent rested its position on
the fusion ban's consequences for minor party success. See Timmons, 520 U.S. 351.
217. See supra note 215.
218. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 200, at 144-53 (arguing that such an approach would be an
invitation to judicial hubris and far-reaching judge-led reforms). Cf Gerken, supra note 3, at
1463 (speculating that "[t]he most likely explanation for the Court's adherence to a conventional
individual-rights approach is that it fears the untrammeled exercise of judicial power in the
political arena.").
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electoral mechanics cases, if meshed with a wholly individualistic
conception of voting rights, threatens to open a Pandora's Box of new
constitutional claims that judges would have little choice but to resolve on
the basis of their personal sense of political fairness. By contrast, a
conception of "burden" linked to aggregate patterns of voter participation
would enable the courts to develop objective and self-limiting standards for
when to intervene. To be sure, the "representative voting public" norm that
I have advanced could be applied in an aggressive manner by an activist
court. But suitably limited-with a strong presumption of permissibility
for ordinary voting requirements, and with a threshold requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate large, politically substantial effects as the trigger for
heightened scrutiny-the norm would not be threatening.
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Appendix
The following table summarizes the votes to date by lower federal and
state court judges in litigation over the constitutionality of photo ID
requirements for voting. It is included to convey some sense of the
apparent pattern of judicial partisanship. The table includes judicial rulings
on motions for preliminary injunctions, merits rulings, and decisions on
appeal from those rulings. However, it excludes rulings by motions' panels
of appellate courts on requests for stays pending a decision on the merits by
the appellate tribunal, which in general seem unlikely to be probative of the
judge's view of the merits of the constitutional question.
219
With the possible exception of the fourth and fifth columns, the table
should be self-explanatory. The fourth column, "pro/anti," is my
classification of what the judge's vote indicates about his or her views
regarding the constitutional merits of the ID requirement-with "pro"
meaning "permissible" and "anti" meaning "impermissible" (cross-party
votes are depicted in bold font). Note that because many of the decisions
recorded in this table are not decisions on the constitutional merits (for
example, a decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction motion, or to
grant or deny a petition for rehearing en banc), the indication offered in the
"pro/anti" column is only an indication. That judges sometimes change
their minds as a case progresses is illustrated by Judge Murphy's opinions
in the federal litigation over Georgia's revised photo ID requirement for
voting. (He initially granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, then ruled for the defendants after a bench trial.)
The fifth column shows the party affiliation most plausibly ascribed to
the judge. In the case of appointed judges, it is the party affiliation of the
appointing president or governor. In the case of judges chosen through
partisan elections, it is the party in whose name the judge ran for office.
By way of summary, Democratic judges have expressed "anti" views
on the constitutionality of photo ID requirements 14 times, and "pro" views
219. With the possible exception of the surprising and unexplained decision of a Ninth
Circuit motions panel (comprised of two Democratic appointees, Judges William P. Fletcher and
Atsushi Tashima), to enjoin enforcement Arizona's Proposition 200 pending disposition, after full
briefing, of the appeal of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The motion
panel's decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a short per curiam opinion warning
against eleventh hour injunctions (just before an election) in election law litigation. See Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
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only 3 times. For Republican judges, the respective numbers are 3 (anti)
and 15 (pro).22°
[Table Begins on Following Page]
220. These summary statistics are slightly different than what the reader will find if she or he
tallies up the votes in the table, because I have excluded votes on the petition for rehearing en
banc in Crawford cast by the three Seventh Circuit judges who sat on the merits panel. It would
be double-counting to treat their rehearing votes as a separate expression of views regarding the
constitutionality of Indiana's voter ID requirement.
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Common Cause/ Harold L. To grant prelim. Anti D 10/8/
Ga. v. Billups (I), Murphy injunction. 2005
406 F. Supp. 2d
1326 (N.D. Ga.
2005)221
Ind. Dem. Party v. Sarah Evans To grant Pro R 4/14/
Rokita, 458 F. Barker defendants' motion 2006
Supp. 2d 775 for summary
(S.D. Ind. judgment.
2006)222
Crawford v. Richard A. To affirm the Pro R 1/4/
Marion County Posner district court's 2007
Election Bd., 472 grant of summary
F.3d 949 (7th Cir. judgment to
2007)223 defendants
Crawford v. Dianne Sykes To affirm the Pro R 1/4/
Marion County district court's 2007
Election Bd., 472 grant of summary
F.3d 949 (7th Cir. judgment to
2007) defendants
Crawford v. Terrance To reverse the Anti D 1/4/
Marion County Evans district court's 2007
Election Bd., 472 grant of summary
F.3d 949 (7th Cir. judgment to
2007) defendants
Crawford v. Frank H. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Easterbrook en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
[Continued on Next Page]
221. At issue was the photo ID requirement enacted by the Georgia legislature in 2005.
222. At issue was the photo ID requirement enacted by the Indiana legislature in 2005.
223. This case is Rokita on appeal sub. nom.; at issue was the photo ID requirement enacted
by the Indiana legislature in 2005.
CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Crawford v. Joel M. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Flaum en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Michael S. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Kanne en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Daniel A. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Manion en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Richard A. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Posner en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Kenneth F. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Ripple en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Ilana To grant rehearing Anti R 4/5/
Marion County Diamond en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 Rovner decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Diane S. To deny rehearing Pro R 4/5/
Marion County Sykes en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
[Continued on Next Page]
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Crawford v. Diane P. To grant rehearing Anti D 4/5/
Marion County Wood en bane of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Terrance T. To grant rehearing Anti D 4/5/
Marion County Evans en bane of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Crawford v. Ann Claire To grant rehearing Anti D 4/5/
Marion County Williams en banc of panel 2007
Election Bd., 484 decision affirming
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. grant of summary
2007) judgment to State.
Gonzalez v. Ariz., Roslyn 0. To deny plaintiffs' Pro D 9/11/
No. CV 06-1268- Silver motions for a 2006
PHX-ROS, 2006 preliminary
WL 3627297 (D. injunction.
Ariz. 2006)224
Gonzalez v. Ariz., John T. To affirm district Pro R 4/20/
485 F.3d 1041 Noonan court's denial of a 2007
(9th Cir. 2007) preliminary
injunction
Gonzalez v. Ariz., George P. To affirm district Pro R 4/20/
485 F.3d 1041 Schiavelli court's denial of a 2007
(9th Cir. 2007) preliminary
injunction
Gonzalez v. Ariz., Mary M. To affirm district Pro D 4/20/
485 F.3d 1041 Schroeder court's denial of a 2007
(9th Cir. 2007) preliminary
injunction
[Continued on Next Page]
224. At issue were the identification requirements for registration and voting found in
Proposition 200, an immigration ballot initiative adopted by the voters in 2004.
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Common Harold M. To grant plaintiffs' Anti D 7/14/
Cause/Ga. v. Murphy motion for a 2006
Billups (I), 439 preliminary
F. Supp. 2d 1294 injunction
(N.D.Ga. 2006)225
Common Harold M. To enter judgment Pro D 9/6/
Cause/Ga. v. Murphy for defendants 2007
Billups (III), 504 after bench trial.
F. Supp. 2d 1333
(N.D.Ga.
2007)226
ACLU v. M. Christina To grant plaintiffs Anti R 2/12/
Santillanes, 2007 Armijo motion for 2007
WL 782167 summary judgment
(D. N.M. 2007) & permanent
injunction
Weinschenk v. Richard G. To grant plaintiffs' Anti D 9/14/
State, No. 06AC- Callahan motion for 2006
CC00587 (Cole declaratory
Cty. Dist. Ct., judgment and
Mo. 2006) permanently enjoin
enforcement of ID
requirement
Weinschenk v. Nancy S. To affirm lower Anti D 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d Rahmeyer court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
Weinschenk v. Laura D. Stith To affirm lower Anti D 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
[Continued on Next Page]
225. At issue was Georgia's revised photo ID requirement for voting, enacted in 2006.
226. At issue was Georgia's revised photo ID requirement for voting, enacted in 2006.
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Weinschenk v. Richard B To affirm lower Anti D 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d Teitelman court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
Weinschenk v. Ronnie White To affirm lower Anti D 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
Weinschenk v. Michael A. To affirm lower Anti D 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d Wolff court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
Weinschenk v. Charles B. To affirm lower Anti R 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d Blackmar court's declaration 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) and permanent
injunction.
Weinschenk v. Stephen N. To vacate lower ?227 R 10/16/
State, 203 S.W.3d Lindbaugh court's decision on 2006
201 (Mo. 2006) ripeness grounds.
Lake v. Perdue, T. Jackson To enjoin Anti ?229 9/22/
2006-CV-1 19207 Bedford, Jr. enforcement of 2006




[Continued on Next Page]
227. Because this was a justiciability holding, I shall refrain from classifying it as "pro" or
"anti" photo ID. Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that courts properly use standing and
related doctrines to avoid reaching the merits-and thereby conferring legitimacy on one side or
the other-with respect to politically contentious constitutional questions).
228. At issue was Georgia's revised photo ID requirement for voting, enacted in 2006,
challenged here on the ground that ID requirements are qualifications for voting and hence
beyond the legislature's authority to enact under the Georgia constitution.
229. The presiding judge was selected in a nonpartisan election.
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ANTI AFF'L.
Perdue v. Lake, Robert To vacate order ?230 D 6/22/
2007 WL Benham below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, Robert To vacate order ?231 D 6/22/
2007 WL Benham below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, George To vacate order ?232 D 6/22/
2007 WL Carley below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, P. Harris To vacate order ?233 D 6/22/
2007 WL Hines below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, Leah Sears To vacate order ?234 D 6/22/
2007 WL below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, Hugh To vacate order ?235 D 6/22/
2007 WL Thompson below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
[Continued on Next Page]
230. I am skeptical that the Justices' decision to dismiss this case on standing grounds-
where, as the Court pointed out, the "sole remaining plaintiff' acknowledged that she had
qualifying ID-reveals anything about the Justices' view concerning the constitutional
permissibility of the photo ID requirement. Cf BICKEL, supra note 227.
231. See supra note 230.
232. See supra note 230.
233. See supra note 230.
234. See supra note 230.
235. See supra note 230.
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
Perdue v. Lake, Harold To vacate order ?236 R 6/22/
2007 WL Melton below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
Perdue v. Lake, Robert To vacate order ?237 D 6/22/
2007 WL Benham below on ground 2007
1660734 (Ga. that plaintiffs'
2007) lacked standing
In re Request for Michael F. To advise that ID Anti D 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Cavanagh requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality unconstitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
In re Request for Marilyn Kelly To advise that ID Anti D 7/18/
Advisory Opinion requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality unconstitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
In re Request for Robert P. To advise that ID Pro R 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Young, Jr. requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality constitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
[Continued on Next Page]
236. See supra note 230.
237. See supra note 230.
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CASE JUDGE VOTE PRO/ PARTY DATE
ANTI AFF'L.
In re Request for Mauro D. To advise that ID Pro R 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Corrigan requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality constitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
In re Request for Stephen J. To advise that ID Pro R 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Markman requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality constitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
In re Request for Clifford W. To advise that ID Pro R 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Taylor requirement is 2007
Regarding facially
Constitutionality constitutional
of 2005 PA 71,
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007).
In re Request for Elizabeth A. To advise that ID Pro R 7/18/
Advisory Opinion Weaver requirement is 2007
Regarding
Constitutionality facially
of 2005 PA 71, constitutional
No. 130589
(Mich. 2007). 1 1 1 1 1
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